Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 20e11791ef24ebdd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

48.0 KB First seen: 2022-09-06
MD5: cf35e4b0d7bed9852e23adb040981ae5 SHA-1: ab6d0e63e6c0b57e97383c35d6b43351d24775e8 SHA-256: 20e11791ef24ebdddfc85e15f1bf18452cdf057dbcdc1b71c47920158f7e9339
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an OOXML document encrypted with a default password, indicating it's an exploit carrier. It specifically triggers the CVE-2017-0199 vulnerability via an embedded OLE object. This vulnerability allows the execution of a remote loader, which is likely to download and execute a second-stage payload from the identified URL.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://dummy_username@192.210.201.56/...--------.-------------------.._---_-----_-------/www_i/www.doc