Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 20cff974367eed6e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCX

271.9 KB Created: 2021-04-18 19:39:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 303f695775a0c750e733ed6259882dcc SHA-1: ea879e410bb69b4a1869c87509b4fd92e8577399 SHA-256: 20cff974367eed6e5b208d69ed49e7a9f50afbeeb60cf2f23a3a2e4ca3f1e08c
220 Risk Score

Heuristics 7

  • CVE-2026-21514 — Word/OLE security bypass in RTF high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    (in altChunk RTF word/fetim.rtf) RTF contains a hidden \svb hex package with DrsE2oDoc and downRevStg drawing compatibility parts. This matches an observed CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape that manipulates Word's internal document structure and trust decisions.
  • altChunk imports embedded RTF (RTF injection) critical OOXML_ALTCHUNK_RTF
    Document inlines an embedded RTF via an aFChunk relationship and a <w:altChunk> body element. This is the canonical RTF-injection wrapper used to smuggle RTF exploits (Equation Editor / URL Moniker / objdata) past DOCX-only scanners. Word opens the wrapper and executes the RTF inline. Recursing into the RTF for the exact exploit primitive.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    (in altChunk RTF word/fetim.rtf) RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX
    (in altChunk RTF word/fetim.rtf) RTF contains ~1029KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    (in altChunk RTF word/fetim.rtf) RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    (in altChunk RTF word/fetim.rtf) RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000af79f.bin
cebaa2a111425014b096c70d975fc18743ef09ed27d52c1f8f71eb8056b73fa7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xAF79F 85526 bytes
objdata_01_off000e8788.bin
31d0b0c8736350c29d658081251eef2ad4e59509fe8222d5a28340dc0162ca79
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE8788 583987 bytes
rtf_svb_00000009.zip
28fc295dafc0bcccd998d6dc34a4e9ae47eb34cb74cb4b892eb6454833467799
rtf-svb-package RTF \svb hex-decoded ZIP at offset 0x9 116932 bytes