Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 20cc95bea0fc72fe…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

605.8 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 4905fb74c335411db7792c96dcbb24cf SHA-1: 84c9cde9fcd702dd65289489946f43c4bc461bbf SHA-256: 20cc95bea0fc72fed74a9e89535aa5ba90d45f82cea0d042dd16f3bc4984768e
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The critical heuristic firings for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_8759 indicate that this RTF document exploits a known vulnerability in the Microsoft Equation Editor component. This vulnerability allows for the execution of arbitrary code, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of OLE object data further supports the exploitation vector.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0008e1ad.bin
ecb422e49b9a97255777e7396b3469342d4992618c76e96893c2c92cc39842f2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8E1AD 3739 bytes