Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 20c0899bca73684f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

140.2 KB Created: 2021-02-07 17:10:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 7e986ecedcd05a233787f23b0df6e646 SHA-1: 525d464c31c22aba8d7e86c7f6654a83d5b4e062 SHA-256: 20c0899bca73684fc13eb0c412c865757fdbd4de2e938e667292e36bd094f461
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The file is an OOXML document containing VBA macros, specifically an AutoOpen macro, which is a common technique for initial execution. The presence of CreateObject calls and the ClamAV detection signature 'Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0' strongly suggest that the macro's purpose is to download and execute a second-stage payload. No specific malware family could be identified, but the overall pattern is consistent with a downloader.

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.BlueWord12210-9918949-0
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
a5b7c433b48caa1975df8aa3599ea3b6004cfb3929df6a34c397cac58f573334		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2447 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
42187ba6fdfd449bc11e2f04d0492c23eafd7e5c2d94c2fda525ddde8a9b20d1		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 99840 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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