Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 20ab69f366e0d7fd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

45.9 KB Created: 2006-12-15 12:15:38 -05:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 6.0.1 (Windows))
MD5: d08045762532e9a75f4f00a93d14ed8c SHA-1: 5f6249f54596a4887308bbe887badef9ea4f2299 SHA-256: 20ab69f366e0d7fda9a981f1cf1e09547fcf9a35a22df76dbe47aa17454915d8
484 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript that utilizes the `exportDataObject` API to drop an executable file named 'routerperformance.pdf' to the user's system. The PDF also contains a launch action that executes 'cmd.exe' with parameters designed to navigate directories and potentially execute the dropped file. The embedded executable was detected by ClamAV as 'Win.Trojan.Rozena-693', and the PDF itself was flagged as 'Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586'. The combination of these factors strongly indicates a malicious intent to deliver and execute a payload.

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\routerperformance.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/iX/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
routerperformance.pdf
d467b4c58105c9945f4bfb899e2b39c2b4e68ba5a1538613cc6d3dcc5ac7c099		 pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 41 at offset 0x6568 37888 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Rozena-693
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
javascript_obj0042_000.js
54c2c91ee4ad10d3ca0f4bcbe2fb3335cf5ce99aa671cf79f570cf11c1eab009		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 42 at offset 0xB350 66 bytes
icc_00_off000051c2.icc
2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e		 pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x51C2 3144 bytes

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