Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 208871f2bda4e733…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.9 KB Created: 2021-04-04 16:46:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-07-10
MD5: a352984e6b4529878d9ce9b908749e1c SHA-1: 81dfa83db84d4e3c5528f15d6ccbaa6ea2c689b4 SHA-256: 208871f2bda4e73386fc75488ccb5ce0ea40ce7444a19c04cfd25291f16e1892
246 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous external links, many of which are part of a link farm, and one specifically impersonates Amazon for credential phishing. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to exploit vulnerabilities or redirect users to phishing sites. The embedded URLs and link farm structure suggest an attempt to distribute malicious content or gather user information.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Brand-impersonation credential phishing lure critical SE_BRAND_CREDENTIAL_PHISH
    Document impersonates a well-known consumer brand and uses account-security / verification language ('unusual activity', 'account on hold', 'verify your account') to steer the reader to a credential-harvesting link. Corroborated by: action link to abused redirector https://befufagu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384284/suzedivogoj_mavigeza_goxutiv.pdf.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://botokaw.ru/strik?utm_term=do+gsm+unlocked+phones+work+with+straight+talk PDF link annotation
    • http://wopisam.iblogger.org/xavarageg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://befufagu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384284/suzedivogoj_mavigeza_goxutiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://noberewesuxo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379636/2454974.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vagibize.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134618654/kagibubumogowel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://badgesverified.com/funeffiouj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://toportt.online/menukuxotorbbsew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://miridudab.iblogger.org/38843980226.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://89d9876f-4e47-4433-ab5b-8da47ae3ae5c.filesusr.com/ugd/37c326_afbc8196fb224e12a9437f88afb29b70.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://c4cd0dbc-23d7-4f11-b65f-2561cec8abe5.filesusr.com/ugd/516793_f0483b3e1d0849f0983c6d1f9b203849.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • http://jomobagezib.rf.gd/b._f._skinner_behaviorism.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://4c5ad993-366d-4b3a-aa99-9b6f56583180.filesusr.com/ugd/01e791_092c9b07a4414ef08eefc546dcf29bb5.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://fe2b84af-b373-48e0-a714-f820169e3fe9.filesusr.com/ugd/ed1d2e_8cf83f2b59534f10ad299d3ef7a65076.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://f8d4b294-f952-4a11-85e8-0a3036f9bdaf.filesusr.com/ugd/ad8f3a_1a79535790b24bc2b16dff2da0f38c5d.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • http://pezomovororiz.rf.gd/68174381698.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://d4f1f58f-bd44-402a-a4b0-a3aa01e36dbf.filesusr.com/ugd/dffefa_b5e60a0379fd4dd9ba2ca191982bf6fb.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://42190e62-4dca-482d-a077-ae7b222d7779.filesusr.com/ugd/b91392_d5d445f9fbcb414694b8bb3a98882587.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://d09251a9-b09e-4077-8ccb-24037f005f7b.filesusr.com/ugd/a6ce17_32829b6a9d5547d29039dec2ca0e3199.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • https://f6142301-0c02-44dd-b2c5-62cf9b3cd0dc.filesusr.com/ugd/ebfdba_a10cd79f855f4b6f928cc652cbef878c.pdf?index=trueIn PDF document text
    • http://fufagarafe.epizy.com/cctv_headquarters_structure.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00010892.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10892 5644 bytes
SHA-256: 7e0ee88f707a7fcc2b33c0d10b15776928923a95e856a9a17215ab8911f73bb7
font_01_sfnt_off00011bb2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11BB2 11208 bytes
SHA-256: d75251a7a0d0133079fda0b67b4053f2c14a2a00dcb2c29304c01ff3e5bb1217

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