Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 20863835bfe7b5fb…

MALICIOUS

RTF

93.3 KB First seen: 2024-08-29
MD5: f3e730b297901499d743de5c1dff1e7d SHA-1: b04e1b970316693c05c918b9f087f43fba243246 SHA-256: 20863835bfe7b5fbec9e7afd08461c711e70ab2bfa9758521744ffe27ce06568
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of \objdata and \objupdate heuristics indicates that the embedded object is designed to be activated, likely leading to the execution of malicious code. This is a common technique for delivering secondary payloads.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000c17.bin
34d1de3051c9dd9d8f3dcd5a7e4db5aa8bac9722e2cf30e4809b2306f459d7e8		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC17 2031 bytes

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