Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 208265dfde00b33e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

29.3 KB First seen: 2022-11-24
MD5: aae5ca317fd665d6268e280f8bba0743 SHA-1: 0f2c76c0dce2372e23492cab798f58cc790984c1 SHA-256: 208265dfde00b33e04cf83a295608b2f507885125ce179ef771f38bff89136c7
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, triggered by \objupdate, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing', a common tactic for macro-based malware droppers to bypass security settings and execute malicious code.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00005c5e.bin
4ab5eff90815708cf2123685bf23a8ccafaaff38b81ad9efb119717917ae9e0a
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x5C5E 1794 bytes