Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 207e07e5dedc6620…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.9 KB Created: 2021-06-23 13:21:53 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 0ed149ce7695122c168e28ceac64f763 SHA-1: b6dec344c75c03ff8ca46bdd9d655aae7626955b SHA-256: 207e07e5dedc66200cfbcc09173ec2d61b8a314d45e6b52311ddccd74320554e
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a significant number of links pointing to various domains, many of which appear to be compromised or disposable hosting. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or SEO spam. The document body itself is heavily obfuscated and contains metadata suggesting it was generated by wkhtmltopdf, but the primary malicious function appears to be the distribution of links.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://wsp.pl/userfiles/file/33319320504.pdf
    • https://lesartsdansmonjardin.com/userfiles/file/20210530155841.pdf
    • http://wagnerpc.com/userfiles/files/9372268717.pdf
    • https://yarsan.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cd8f8dfc56d68a29e727c04b21cd5c36/saxibuverozomug.pdf
    • http://nuyewpilot.academy/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/be242e6f83189556ee36bbcafb585e7d/fabedumutapo.pdf
    • http://aeskulap24h.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160722f527df3c---80897680284.pdf
    • http://menu2uplus.com/images/file/fudinidusufu.pdf
    • http://lawcab.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a2352992ed0---51229847590.pdf
    • https://dudikom.pl/userfiles/file/gigapeditifaboxegiz.pdf
    • http://animalscipublisher.com/files/upfiles/file/xolututefupe.pdf
    • https://law.myvzl.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6q1eurnjiras8l29ot2ptbgdpc/32717207598.pdf
    • https://csom.cz/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/dab70edc46a1eeb35a966a8343093e2b/rofotolaxupofo.pdf
    • https://too.kg/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0daa55d4784a981f81e308ee68bc12f6/nebodiwugufi.pdf
    • http://coinmarketsuite.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/74105118268.pdf
    • http://chataphan.com/file_media/file_image/file/lopilufidi.pdf
    • http://ackerviewguesthouse.com/userfiles/file/robakixibik.pdf
    • https://advicezone.org.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/gtb5v3mbklieoor2bg7kpec174/29957051311.pdf
    • https://laetitiabernard.fr/images/file/vogezot.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=black+beauty+by+anna+sewell+questions+and+answers
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000eac3.bin
eacead62a5497a565e488653cb551045b64eecf2b04c9139a0f92a65eac244c5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEAC3 5504 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fda1.bin
f57ae929e0e482c4618238dad012926dd55985a7d974b6bc15902dc30b150d72		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFDA1 11424 bytes

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