Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 20768835be4c0985…

MALICIOUS

PDF

37.8 KB Created: 2020-10-25 07:53:49 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-12-25
MD5: a6a7c95f94fab01e731372e0863f5ead SHA-1: a761da5738ec97a609131c7f5b53b17244360de3 SHA-256: 20768835be4c098539184300232788448a34e4a7bd3cf0897425a1776e41e299
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/aws?keyword=power+amplifiers+nptel+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://rigitugatelimo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/1/134131632/7883473.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dokakida.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380589/nedakiloput_bilofevuwuv_siweferog_vifinufawovuteg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://puniduvete.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134341297/48872968eb93ba5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dodivimibo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134305777/tuwupigewomelisoke.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374852/normal_5f8cabfdb5c6d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dirigesibujov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969991/7629182.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kikuvabafot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134332304/majaxoguwivilesu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4371265/normal_5f94d24473c44.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366018/normal_5f94ddd8c6874.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sakukavazu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379729/lifurufixonuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://folarudivol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871739/9495529.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://toxavikosas.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134437834/d1f0e2bd35e8.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zigegawemofeza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406932/zutugofuz-mafijik-fakofilisita.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vozutadisifik.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483249/ec8faee.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kudizuvawemexol.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134307781/sepowi-rofumolovojexas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bopiwode.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134367631/dedasizaxajevumuli.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fiwatinizajof.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874156/moxuguwufadonub_getafupakebon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://misikeni.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134336029/a06e38a243d8e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://saxexowiki.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969873/32de67401d0371f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005345.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5345 5280 bytes
SHA-256: 2a02cf1cae1f280d73179a5320b936a123f71388982b45c5c197bbc7fee16f1f
font_01_sfnt_off00006534.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6534 10676 bytes
SHA-256: 6b51fa68f50be2fa75e04637e728cd4ff1ccedd7215c43517b3f5164a2290cc1

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