Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 206ffd0bd61efa5d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

142.0 KB Created: 2020-06-03 17:04:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 7d1a39534446027dc3020737d4f5b4b4 SHA-1: 029faf254b7ae8dfa259f579a2cfa3ea8a4a817d SHA-256: 206ffd0bd61efa5d7555466690e7e20ee7bcf6f8e45323bb1bb01b85073bc77b
260 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML document contains a Document_Open macro, which is a critical finding indicating immediate execution upon opening. This macro utilizes WScript.Shell and CreateObject, common techniques for executing arbitrary commands and downloading/executing second-stage payloads. The presence of these critical heuristics strongly suggests a macro-based attack designed to compromise the user's system.

Heuristics 7

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
16f67b859b5ecf24484cd454edb1bddb4d160c3ce039005b9d238b2ccaf52e68		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3166 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
c080c171f1db3fa76ae00032f37f3f03089fb1aa32e5dd01da8a3dfc6c413bd7		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 11264 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.

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