Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 20672b210682cb66…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

55.5 KB
MD5: 83c7ec1def021ee27063f1edb7973d6c SHA-1: 59e984de3be5dae5c0b37d939dfaa7c70b50dd32 SHA-256: 20672b210682cb6629d02fc62cb8cf81a78df1e61093df3019d3a2e4fee38105
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The RTF document contains OLE objects and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" directives strongly indicates the exploitation of a known vulnerability within the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution. No further payload or specific family indicators were extracted.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000008b3.bin
55543efef33654872241663497f9ae34bcad325596a93e2b9625a15aea9a7287
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8B3 1865 bytes