Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 205995e5835ec0af…

MALICIOUS

RTF

341.2 KB
MD5: 776ae5196f616bd6bf2a7fe34d7a5812 SHA-1: 6c576351c60b203500b179054303ccc39db564c5 SHA-256: 205995e5835ec0afdb827c868f5ec7e8f87f0328ca85ade3ac73cc585790a242
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File T1566 Phishing T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked and updated objects, which are designed to be activated by the user. The presence of a 'Macro/content-enable lure' heuristic indicates the document likely instructs the user to enable content, a common tactic for malware droppers. Without further script or body content, the exact payload and delivery mechanism remain unclear, but the intent is to leverage OLE object activation for malicious purposes.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000969.bin
7ff2741efd0a20087af6b48bc49d0d9106758e0724e818770d5bb8927a550982
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x969 75720 bytes
objdata_01_off00027144.bin
f4c761490fd63fc4aa791746a9a2b588dafd9e2c764f57f0c85377b99ef07062
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x27144 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off000286e7.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x286E7 12297 bytes