Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 2054527d6406eb39…

MALICIOUS

PDF

81.9 KB Created: 2021-08-23 12:43:03 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-01
MD5: 2ffd7f29ddeea6e8c0b85cff0a42506b SHA-1: 2fdbe5a916cff3e62fc59161481518af20a19644 SHA-256: 2054527d6406eb3955dc8ba6d89f6401deb0b0b0811455c239a852b6b05a2ad3
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF contains an embedded script that appears to be a lure, referencing 'Run batch file on remote computer powershell' in its metadata. The PDF also leverages a link farm strategy, pointing to numerous compromised websites and disposable hosting domains, likely to distribute further malicious content or phish users. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9989

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.lenoir-elec.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/stofica72up7prje3idn8s2gki/18344793575.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://artospace.com/pics/file/sowapejugumijexujizabi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.chubsorn.com/file/files/68675060895.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.alertgy.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d3b30003e8a17bb750ec13b2c99a1403/1976975510.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.christinemartin.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160988eab98f06---nojog.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.cdscabling.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b9b6cd0eb11---76062022689.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://best-turbos.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/0da3ab707c84f851dffd059e5f5f8091/vujenixene.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ngonluathan.vn/images/ckeditor/files/936672284.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://baihsad.com/userfiles/files/20210712_211648.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://solemarservizi.it/userfiles/files/53664271129.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anapro.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/kuxisem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://foodvellythailand.com/upload/files/13520486758.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.a2zmedical.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609dc5b3673a0---tegesozekolesawotikulalir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://haisushitogo.com/uploads/files/74069845948.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vinaconexmec.vn/uploads/news_file/saziragorutukek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://szermgrt.hu/uploads/ckfinder/userfiles/files/zugupelikebagisebisus.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bczenekar.hu/files/file/favumakiwuresibemowitave.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alituncer.com/userfiles/file/gikajelep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://quiltingacademy.com/fckeditor/userfiles/file/95756214999.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bewegeninarnhem.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16093da4248d9a---32805493978.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dansecyr.ca/pdf/file/pidotowinudo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bjoybrands.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084d5d65ae38---nipupoxowa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dfa-finanz.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609ee1a58a3e5---16359416155.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.bountyvacation.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606c7c8ee8cd4---99431364414.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=run+batch+file+on+remote+computer+powershellPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_00014259.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x14259 1624 bytes
SHA-256: e22cdd155506ec5c3c0cf40011bd80136116124cec9bf638c421522f166eb3f6
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='PDFedit'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Zabuye Cefigijo</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Run batch file on remote computer powershell.   When it comes to managing remote computers with PowerShell, you have essentially three options. Yo</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Run batch file on remote computer powershell.   When it comes to managing remote computers with PowerShell, you have essentially three options. Yo</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Run batch file on remote computer powershell</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='PDFedit'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-03-18T17:27:51'
  xmp:CreatorTool='PDFedit'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='d3419f8f-8fd3-454b-a158-7e814ecba071'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='48cf4680-117b-40a4-aeb6-a2794718e24c'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000d932.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD932 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000f144.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF144 17616 bytes
SHA-256: aa2856c34fbcd252d0bc04eee438c31b942e730bc7907d0391c1bf34bf139c09
font_02_sfnt_off00011fca.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11FCA 11116 bytes
SHA-256: 7b7c7ca0fefc6361484cad51267bd919ad8e89a155d46692ef0188934e380e69

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.