Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 — Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 204ddfa116547c8f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.50 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-24
MD5: 1fff2a793aa94b10a5fb5214d7dd9d79 SHA-1: 996dc89c8c728d9bf15a26fd2722927d2ed2d395 SHA-256: 204ddfa116547c8f47ca8440fa9f958445249bb9af4657dcc7a78787fd414ce6
332 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204 User Execution

The XLS file contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object that exploits CVE-2017-11882. This object contains a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, has a direct link to an executable or archive. The ClamAV detection name 'Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0' further supports its role as a downloader.

Heuristics 9

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • ClamAV: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Xls.Downloader.94c25b356b5a6cac-9978798-0
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 6

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
6d310e9d7635dceccc808c57838958ca6a6513607af52519261a78c6251d12ba		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD00328D73/oLe10NatIVE 1313 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0005c200.pdf
38bd9338eca60c3830db27a40db5e7320c55465b7d8efedd1512e83ef1643a18		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x5C200 1197568 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001200.pdf
063d57fc72af1b3c369bf9f900271d2ec2e3c6f93e9f8a129cef71119be16acd		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1200 1570304 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
4ca28b5185b0be0e9d6a4af348b5ed5d3c7aa08d23f6dae2899c35987751914f		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1548800 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00019000.pdf
c2ad779e4c9a7755da6f6014b133f0ce14753b0e29cbe9c9d5a541092e44b8be		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x19000 1472512 bytes

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