Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 204c46cbdd0d639d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

34.8 KB Created: 2020-10-09 00:49:15 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 39db5abf7106ef542bf7bf0d7019f3ff SHA-1: 2cdaf3e6f67ffb39a1e12a1e272057a93051c260 SHA-256: 204c46cbdd0d639dfafdce283b34488cb517f3c74e52358bdfa8ae7947de2923
124 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded links that redirect to malicious infrastructure, specifically a URL designed to mimic a search result for a book title. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the heuristic firings confirm the presence of a malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains the malicious URL, suggesting an attempt to disguise the true destination.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 4

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=the+norton+anthology+of+american+literature+shorter+8th+edition+pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.repopgifts.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776885/doraxowolew_lajizipetowi_kuropanoribi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.threeaineconsultancy.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070125/587526f65.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037106.mozfiles.com/files/1037106/nubugib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1036932.mozfiles.com/files/1036932/javowaxuwopeluziwejuxax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1037860.mozfiles.com/files/1037860/43243226464.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://site-1043126.mozfiles.com/files/1043126/86991674505.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/307d0768-16e1-4218-aeb2-16dce5fc0001/sugodoxebawudegabokanesa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/98020984-ab0f-4bc2-ba4b-a19dd01e253f/vevolomevinuvenubinaketal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/de8804c9-f2b4-485c-becb-87c55057396f/19895666959.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c39b4831-46ce-4617-96a8-11189b74172f/51163911709.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/7780/3925/files/jumper_steven_gould.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0482/1129/6410/files/at2020_xlr_vs_usb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0485/3222/6203/files/pemexofaroneporozafa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0479/2116/8540/files/jiwekomujo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/7945/1295/files/rate_my_porfessor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00004864.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x4864 5812 bytes
SHA-256: d59ff7f33202fc77a70d3402572229b7e59dabd7910cd60c0f1bbbec22e4005e
font_01_sfnt_off00005c0d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5C0D 9964 bytes
SHA-256: a04225058e114cb5663dc103e6f6bc987ea78ff5a01d890b59b80a85b1d9cde7

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