Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 202d979d74f0478d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

89.5 KB Created: 2020-05-25 17:50:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: 8f393ad2269506b5b8daac55592d1fd1 SHA-1: a7157700d321c79ac241240c972a4654f25fd6ed SHA-256: 202d979d74f0478de0fbea103e2585a84fdab5646ad19437f5e4c4ba0cda7b90
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a DOCM file containing VBA macros, indicated by the OOXML_VBA and OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN heuristics. The OLE_VBA_SHELL and OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ heuristics suggest the macro attempts to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of 'macros.bas' and 'vbaProject_00.bin' further confirms the macro-based nature of this malicious document.

Heuristics 6

  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
8fa357286ba31939e5d5da97c4e67deb233fa3e71c6b4dd92f71dccbfe743991
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 2796 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.
vbaProject_00.bin
89330d68ff7b6909511aaee940c437183be5ca8874d19fd09418a7b91ed4bf8f
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 11776 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s). Carved macro source contains an auto-exec entry point and execution/download terms.