Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 200acc7f2c682a11…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

27.0 KB First seen: 2022-11-21
MD5: 962cffd99bdc793a4be372de2846e36d SHA-1: 655878671708ee824f00daa033f9b274e9c66cb5 SHA-256: 200acc7f2c682a11762cd66158f15aafa2143f3aeecf62d1152cc4fde6224bad
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, and the document body includes a lure to 'Enable editing', suggesting a malicious payload delivery mechanism. No scripts were extracted, and the specific exploit target is not definitively identified beyond the Equation Editor.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004e87.bin
042309efe64c63001fefc94c5e23d7d14b184a509b4ec8e5b9f01a7ba2738642
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4E87 1663 bytes