Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1ff58e3c5c2aa49a…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.7 KB Created: 2020-11-02 17:01:40 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: ee93f788e661978d6721b65f1d39bd78 SHA-1: 1e8e02883ce766a070ca2ea04a599101b982e95c SHA-256: 1ff58e3c5c2aa49afd4c5363295d6caa609e609c434dedff5b5dc2fae21ac05f
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of embedded links pointing to external resources, many of which are hosted on disposable or SEO-optimized domains. One critical heuristic indicates that the PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that matches one of the identified IOCs. The presence of numerous links suggests a tactic to distribute traffic or host further malicious content, potentially as part of a phishing campaign.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=canon+mg3122+manual+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://rojusonevupa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814232/foxujabejamijitam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xulavuxedipi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134017657/3271769.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xojerajap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384359/1441493.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://purusoze.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134495244/wokisarile.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://besavikeneg.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132815808/3b81d9366.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0505/2655/2248/files/27693874447.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/4c2e8ac0-ce5c-41b2-837b-86be235115ca/jofaviva.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e6c516b6-bea4-4bdf-b954-ac3722b72e86/nubovopub.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/gofiguj/93049503127.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/459f7d74-102c-4c93-9bbf-b685bc7643a8/66476513718.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/ruzaganog/convert_to_base64_encoded_string.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c807242e-bf14-4251-9c31-6302ffb84952/83280913688.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0496/5272/7972/files/distributive_property_multiplication_worksheet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0482/6434/7812/files/masarisalakepebobuv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00007132.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7132 5340 bytes
SHA-256: 6103e55a1c3a36397da48cc1e4898b9a9c446947ae6b9e43d19bb4bc1a949320
font_01_sfnt_off00008358.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8358 10180 bytes
SHA-256: e37370edcd07f4703ae380adeb7068e64c40291822fe4646ba37636a4457eb5a

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