Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1f9b008eaab4fe82…

MALICIOUS

PDF

64.8 KB Created: 2020-11-09 10:07:24 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-03-01
MD5: 2c4c8b25bd4d5522990548a227d57eaf SHA-1: a625b3e41b0d09b4d54f2bd685250f5edceb3ad1 SHA-256: 1f9b008eaab4fe8271e2a1955dcf68af94dbd7cf99bf478180d5ebe81e5edd19
184 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffking.ru/aws?keyword=american+manual+alphabet+pdf In PDF document text
    • https://raminatu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134579417/4095018.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kizozejibudi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134460324/2311601.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kefanizitadibuz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134328212/2889798.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wubigunes.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134507070/wuzeviruvax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nujidigazinuwag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134318548/6067248.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lukafitujukeme.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133997152/c72c21e5fc6f.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://fedorahosted.org/lohitIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/xarojapi/weird_undertale_flash_games.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c1779b44-9515-4ec9-a1c7-b19860906f61/49340117743.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/073e5145-9e22-4957-8dfc-25715e952dd1/percent_yield_worksheet_answer_key.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/tadovu/apache_ranger_user_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/mijedusovineti/bibubizekirepup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000a3eb.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA3EB 3696 bytes
SHA-256: 88514365903d59b72d87d4cfe208d7b4b0616c913b9c77cfea01e8bb43437175
font_01_sfnt_off0000b12b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB12B 5348 bytes
SHA-256: a9cb4c360789853dc743bf9c92d95c05854f8610ce6e2026247634cf8e15ab6c
font_02_sfnt_off0000c326.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC326 12952 bytes
SHA-256: 4ba1f0f85d4e8051c779e143af769aee9a5f3fa6f7c7578946175a374c2f110e
font_03_sfnt_off0000ec1b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEC1B 2320 bytes
SHA-256: eff5dea21679b94fba6adfa20d5484cc972ea2a705a67325d9b5d10654944491