Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1f827da501de98aa…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.79 MB
MD5: de385163b468d7b6e4e9b0ac885e6457 SHA-1: f3dacf3982bbd5f51264cbd3fc522a1c33b541aa SHA-256: 1f827da501de98aad5fd27dfd67c6c068ec3f029b804fbfd67cf0d5cad712cef
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882, specifically related to the Equation Editor. The presence of \objdata and \objupdate directives, along with the critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, strongly suggests that this file is designed to trigger this known vulnerability. The embedded OLE object, identified as Equation.3, is the likely vector for code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011e1.bin
1bf52ed2fe632fb604f3c3a05fe9e5c9ace01c022facc11a8cc1dabd10eb4500
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1 54943 bytes
objdata_01_off00032be7.bin
03211e05043a677f06b3f64e0cdcdb6b199d5735858db254e800c26d06c26b2f
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x32BE7 400306 bytes