Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1f4aa3ccce02b933…

MALICIOUS

PDF

426.9 KB Created: 2010-04-20 06:28:22 Authoring application: HP 9100C Digital Sender
MD5: 41b973cdf2b9024772428b8fbc34cbd7 SHA-1: ded29d0da1e19b15f5279a92304b5a67f637cf1f SHA-256: 1f4aa3ccce02b933e8753a264abd5a2db22c8950b96df11346b01aecc4fa3964
302 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: User Execution: Malicious File T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file contains multiple critical heuristic firings indicating exploitation of CVE-2009-4324 (media.newPlayer) and CVE-2010-0188 (CCITTFaxDecode + active content). It also contains an embedded Windows executable payload and JavaScript. The presence of these elements strongly suggests the PDF is designed to exploit vulnerabilities and deliver a secondary malicious executable to the user.

Heuristics 12

  • media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 critical CVE exact CVE_2009_4324
    PDF JavaScript calls media.newPlayer — CVE-2009-4324 is a use-after-free in Adobe Reader's multimedia plugin triggered by media.newPlayer(). Actively exploited as a zero-day in December 2009. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • CCITTFaxDecode + active content — LibTIFF CVE-family indicator high CVE related PDF_CCITT_CVE_2010_0188_RELATED
    PDF uses /CCITTFaxDecode together with JavaScript, XFA, or RichMedia indicators. This matches the delivery pattern for Adobe Reader LibTIFF/CCITTFax parser exploit families, including CVE-2010-0188, but does not prove the exact malformed TIFF primitive.
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • OpenAction trigger high PDF_OPENACTION
    PDF has an /OpenAction — code runs automatically when opened
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE
    PDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
  • PDF differential parser failed info PDF_DIFFERENTIAL_PARSE_FAILED
    The cross-check parser (pdfminer.six) failed on this file: PDF differential parser failed: PSSyntaxError. Static heuristics still ran and any of their findings above are valid; only the differential cross-check signal is missing.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0016_000.js
30d9b74bb61366acacae6aac180b340f25e7f910c0ab25cb3a7b65bff2b9892b		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 16 at offset 0x300 5945 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
embedded_pdf_00001e73.exe
68258a0db0c4a1409288899e8c2992a72660d1105072d815c5f73c6b8fa330a9		 embedded-pe PDF decompressed stream PE payload at offset 0x1E73 429301 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.66, consistent with packed or encrypted content.
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e81f.pdf
b045a0a3e6ab09b87fd5c34d49ec3a6137d23674afc9b7b7b75cb4947c80a8cf		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside pdf container at offset 0xE81F 377693 bytes

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