Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1f2afec99d6f1d18…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

33.1 KB First seen: 2022-12-13
MD5: 376ee17137cb7033718057574c46b04c SHA-1: f20d4b1db4e99c3e443d5598d117d13dd0a700d2 SHA-256: 1f2afec99d6f1d18fd1596293088712aceae5671c77542222ed61ff640766560
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the object is designed to be activated automatically upon opening, bypassing user interaction for macro enablement. The document body contains a lure related to marketing strategy, which is likely a distraction from the malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004cbc.bin
24ad65105c527c9bb672f70f248ae0abf94b1f1af567d12b7fa5fe42c1684039
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4CBC 1912 bytes