Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1ee5a28b1b6cdcdc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

52.1 KB Created: 2020-10-26 01:40:23 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-12-26
MD5: 0504f147ee36047799d74539c515a3b3 SHA-1: 72760f839a2964964014002b0816f52d473eba5e SHA-256: 1ee5a28b1b6cdcdc05a8a92a5eee328e50409545f5dc893003da0bf56e0d71ac
204 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/123?keyword=nomao+camera+app+download+android In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369916/normal_5f88dc9446c89.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4388819/normal_5f911c59ad6fc.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365606/normal_5f875a60c8d06.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4380539/normal_5f95fa4a7934d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4389365/normal_5f91007380c86.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fivilogavizizov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134446089/fuvigewam-jagopovidura-todafojofol.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://raralafelu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134476833/5490813.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wixurawitubeza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134319602/7803751.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wekubuzebebam.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739705/4557705.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xavujome.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739328/napokuporix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jakedekokobara.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131381480/124223.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sovopubi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775052/4317839.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kidunaxu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437100/lokidoradid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gemaxudemaxepeb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070646/0f2364.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nitetezelimon.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438651/ab724f1c868.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jubunukaf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131483214/6bd860ad2.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xilorufanil.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739938/vunononadenupo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xelenupexom.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134480667/9988846be63b4d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kavaxaxogemiren.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134441995/131a48.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00008cca.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00008cca.bin)
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/felasorarabipis/mielomeningocele_vejiga_neurogenica.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0497/3425/4741/files/79772966220.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0481/4353/2185/files/biblia_plenitud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00008cca.bin)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00008cca.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x8CCA 5104 bytes
SHA-256: 5bc06aef75276656a59a5bc3e173ed84377832867e502e19d14196de59373239
font_01_sfnt_off00009e17.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9E17 10700 bytes
SHA-256: 2ad4dc9c9f3b51e992f7d385f984fac43621040d9321957182b8066876267b3f