Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1ee285449a1255f9…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

525.7 KB Created: 2018-10-24 03:12:08 Authoring application: Windows Installer XML (3.5.0626.0)
MD5: fe89ad168686861d6b207cae648f8c9c SHA-1: 5fd2dc1004b1bcbc889b0858910726ab51c00d3f SHA-256: 1ee285449a1255f9b4ee58835621700c9680b69d4a8e846f6c6f0c59cba4df15
82 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file exhibits characteristics of a malicious OLE document, including a large slack space and an appended executable payload. Although VBA macros could not be extracted due to an unsupported format, the presence of an appended payload strongly indicates a dropper or downloader functionality. The embedded URL 'http://microsoft.com' is noted, though its reputation is unknown.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 538,335 bytes but its declared streams total only 31,321 bytes — 507,014 bytes (94%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • OLE file has appended executable-looking payload bytes high OLE_APPENDED_PAYLOAD
    OLE compound file contains a large high-entropy region beyond the declared major streams and that region includes shellcode, PE, or loader API markers. This is a payload-carrier signal, not a specific CVE attribution by itself.
  • Unsupported Office format for VBA extraction info OFFICE_FORMAT_UNSUPPORTED
    olevba could not extract VBA macros (PermissionError); format-agnostic byte-level scans still ran. Likely legacy, encrypted, or malformed OLE/OOXML — re-scanning the same bytes will yield the same outcome.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://microsoft.com0
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crl0a
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/MicCodSigPCA2011_2011-07-08.crt0
    • http://go.microsoft.com/fwlink/?LinkID=91955ARPNOREPAIRARPNOMODIFYemptyfalseJoltVersionSOFTWARE\Microsoft\Silverlight[FullVersion
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crl0X
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftTimeStampPCA.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/microsoftrootcert.crl0T
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicrosoftRootCert.crt0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crl0^
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut2011_2011_03_22.crt0��
    • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/docs/primarycps.htm0@

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.