RTF malware analysis — malicious · 1edf58da7a1e1d1b

MALICIOUS

RTF

194.2 KB First seen: 2020-02-04

MD5: 242accb2e22f3d9d69155bf6cc903bcf SHA-1: c49ff39964278b7219b7bc75f83ae5d634ac8a94 SHA-256: 1edf58da7a1e1d1b1d6503f2a5c50dfa4a7d7d8bfe44bde71c0bb924a6b29582

182 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object that decodes to a PE file, leveraging the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Equation Editor. This technique is commonly used to deliver a secondary payload, indicating a malicious document designed for exploitation.

Heuristics 5

Decoded Equation Editor payload + PE critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF decodes to an Equation Editor ProgID adjacent to OLE activation and the same decoded object stream contains embedded PE bytes. This matches the Equation Editor exploit surface used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 documents, while requiring payload evidence to avoid flagging benign Equation references.
Equation Editor OLE1 native payload — CVE-2017-11882 related critical CVE related CVE_2017_11882_RELATED

RTF decodes to an OLE1 Equation.3 embedded object whose native data is large and payload-like, and \objupdate requests automatic activation. This is the delivery shape used by Equation Editor RCE documents such as CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802, but the malformed MTEF record needed for exact attribution was not recovered.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off0000006d.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x6D	99353 bytes
SHA-256: `c86c5b533bbb514f969348e1f78eb77920bf273491b31e61ab92fea6f9084a82`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Carved artifact entropy is 8.00, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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