Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1ea3157626b572e8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.7 KB Created: 2020-05-19 12:04:25 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 159e93f59ec56c97818e2d93e812e681 SHA-1: 0a9d89c75860e1d3d1091522dfe982df1381a8fc SHA-256: 1ea3157626b572e86619ec9a65f41523370829f23e5888807097369e7f428881
94 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains a large number of embedded external links, a technique often used for SEO spam or to redirect users to malicious sites. The ML classifier strongly indicated maliciousness, and the PDF structure suggests a link farm designed to distribute traffic across numerous domains. The primary purpose appears to be directing users to external content rather than exploiting a vulnerability within the PDF itself.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 4

  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://bootcampsanatonio.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130435891/130435891.html#l+ironie+dans+candide
    • http://cowboysoriginals.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813975/8392434.pdf
    • http://bestfriendsbakery.net/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639450/pubedemejarofaba.pdf
    • http://wakeupamericacampaign.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131856266/kakor_wasaxuvit_gofarufabosawep.pdf
    • http://mackenzieemievents.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814479/abdfef91e6.pdf
    • http://adaptivetechniquesconcepts.net/uploads/1/3/0/6/130639147/f05a156.pdf
    • http://armada-petroleum.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969809/9838390.pdf
    • http://transcendtosantanas.space/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453302/1826381.pdf
    • http://sandras-makeup.com/uploads/1/3/0/4/130483142/jojuwaziwude.pdf
    • http://sukyphotography.com/uploads/1/3/0/6/130620927/d7ae44128.pdf
    • http://pulsonativo.com/uploads/1/3/1/1/131163776/2c6749705b6a412.pdf
    • http://brunswickjunctionflowerboutique.com/uploads/1/3/0/5/130588923/bewerasi.pdf
    • http://dugganglass.net/uploads/1/3/1/4/131437756/7555582.pdf
    • http://napacounty-rc.com/uploads/1/3/0/2/130288579/vusilape.pdf
    • http://viiasaunas.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383770/refujelis-lemadirakitaro.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006bed.bin
c2ba5d5b2856673fab174899f9714a3751260c198ec2c7c0bc58712ed9fe8649		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6BED 12148 bytes

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