RTF malware analysis — malicious · 1e8eb41fef0fb0bd

MALICIOUS

RTF

99.4 KB First seen: 2023-09-29

MD5: 71f512d16689197ac0ca673fcf8e0d65 SHA-1: 4ebc2126574bc2d69ee7307c90d57ea5b2320593 SHA-256: 1e8eb41fef0fb0bde52030cff289b87abcd631c72f79d7da7b1f5ae6815a13d9

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known exploit technique. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'Enable editing' and mentions enabling macros, indicating an attempt to bypass security measures. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" directives further suggests the activation of embedded objects, likely to execute the exploit.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000034aa.bin` `a19e60ad63ed51d8b82cea63a6b5046490f37919c3092bf1dc852ce1517c0355`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x34AA	1733 bytes

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