Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1e83ad916c42de87…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.1 KB Created: 2020-12-02 13:49:23 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-02
MD5: d56c660849b97242daaadc0f395a9069 SHA-1: 912b58edf22fe91205682becf82709382f355fd8 SHA-256: 1e83ad916c42de87882e68e37fb1d984833980d5df24bba70b72b6a326999d0b
206 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document was flagged as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier. It uses a QR-code lure. The file embeds a large number of external links characteristic of an SEO link farm. Specific URLs and indicators for this sample are listed in the indicators section.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://trafficel.ru/strik?utm_term=civil+war+answers PDF link annotation
    • https://vuzejugusu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134486163/5603849.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dimaxafazeza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453031/kezedivalo-bolumukejufufik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tololomajaju.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134472688/2f8ce.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lifufokawalujiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134687559/wizuwi_fipupakijegib_tiwiko_fozuvi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wudumimimi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134356267/01fbee9a9dd9af9.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://diwapexag.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134484560/lusiwajimi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rikurifijuse.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134681474/jomukirenetalezatobi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xujaxivef.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438557/1863925.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jaxemojemilela.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134622921/belot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wiworixoso.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134321663/1190807.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nutifikidejuz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134347692/pulaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wokusozevopiwaj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134381386/0b0c0eb7912b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jezonekapinojel.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134619201/e20644d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kezevamu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134266298/9703011.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://static1.squarespace.com/static/5fc002d40b6b03258f30bf3d/t/5fc255db9d79364840d990ce/1606571483901/54481326278.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/jamokaroxoj/chordata_characteristics.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e0ec.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE0EC 4736 bytes
SHA-256: e861b6fdace525c1584aa18f4b48c604f4abe3c7d34f5a5bd6c2ca7d287fd4bb
font_01_sfnt_off0000f11e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF11E 9992 bytes
SHA-256: d3c775103cce5c7c5d3c2988a7c0d4ff0fb3ccc80aa05ed7bda36c211cad66a1

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