Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1e693cd70f37232e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.4 KB
MD5: d319b745542d55d5419da362324b831a SHA-1: f2bad47925be12cab45e98a3b48db76e57345c8c SHA-256: 1e693cd70f37232ef1c456d7ae9772a707b72ab9d0b9ece155448b92fa224b41
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically targeting the Equation Editor component. The presence of RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics indicates an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability in the Equation Editor to achieve arbitrary code execution. The embedded OLE object is likely the payload delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000008d.bin
9c682de740cb4bd7998b6ad08716d6b9d4c28aaf228976a07602a95f96884171
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8D 1947 bytes