Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1e5fd965c9296912…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.4 KB Created: 2020-11-07 10:54:04 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-10-31
MD5: 244578d28ec9a239c811fb8bdba32601 SHA-1: 840007c33f4e0195dd9da51df33beb8bac3e8024 SHA-256: 1e5fd965c929691214cf67c96046b6b7e3209aef21068fd5510233317fb824f6
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF document contains a large number of embedded links, with many pointing to disposable hosting services and one specifically to a known malicious redirector. This indicates a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or phish users. The ML classifier also strongly flagged this PDF as malicious.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/123?keyword=niv+application+commentary+ezra+nehemiah In PDF document text
    • https://zadefiwexosufe.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/6/134634331/4775214.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jiwepurojal.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775762/notugawi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vewutaniwem.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873717/vemegarobema-xinexolo-gavegomavaxovow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kilesikawagex.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134372597/6329886.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rizowexerezo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/2/134265486/kogijuwudor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gevafitasib.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380901/c25f730.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://busaluvugisegiw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134368440/mumura_wazekinawu_pisurikesujab_kebituwopawur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lagukekejase.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130815031/wusinaje_zeluze_fudakatulizix.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mejefarekobuk.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134338461/kapogedax.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nikokabiliru.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131409463/mizavoruriji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4417140/normal_5f9c1188a183b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/01675d70-0e3a-48cb-9826-e0a8acb9ec1c/gadazitexakonun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lulagapo.files.wordpress.com/2020/11/68624631580.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006e49.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6E49 5176 bytes
SHA-256: 44f67830b56511e4b24312f685b7b1be377a15db7eb4c51e5c6fefe42d119731
font_01_sfnt_off00007fd4.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7FD4 10804 bytes
SHA-256: e932203705e4c4e449d9dc7bbb3fa4aec1eaa29db7795f57e5b3dd348cfff566

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