Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1e5a3cc16e15da09…

MALICIOUS

RTF

9.1 KB First seen: 2019-06-27
MD5: 3de59bd9491191fb89e8a1e93d603bff SHA-1: 65569912d01640ca3f29509b924c92043a7e3b8d SHA-256: 1e5a3cc16e15da099fe8555f43b951466048838e42a88075343c4f6794dea023
280 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering critical heuristics for Equation Editor exploitation and CVE-2017-11882. This indicates the file is designed to exploit this vulnerability for client-side execution. The ClamAV detection further confirms its malicious nature. No specific family could be identified, but the exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882
    Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Exploit.CVE_2017_11882-6934206-0
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000003f.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3F 4649 bytes
SHA-256: 699f1ea4cb8c30d64f025c64a9afa53d11c76aacf4ba1bb547dcbe78617e0ac3

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