RTF malware analysis — malicious · 1e526618f9407ee1

MALICIOUS

RTF

2.00 MB Created: 2018-03-04 14:26:00 First seen: 2019-03-18

MD5: ca80d0df38241442e83c3ec066767672 SHA-1: 711de252b4a4419a053dbb160506d2a07519d177 SHA-256: 1e526618f9407ee126562df50a17f9c36c2ff503e7a8ff53846752c3bf9b1973

542 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple critical heuristic firings indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 (Equation Editor) and CVE-2017-8759 (MSXML SAX). The presence of OLE object data, excessive hex data, and a PE header within the RTF strongly suggests that the file is a dropper designed to exploit these vulnerabilities to execute a secondary payload. The document body also contains a lure to 'Enable editing', a common tactic for malicious documents.

Heuristics 14

Equation Editor CLSID critical CVE likely RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
CVE-2017-11882 — Equation Editor FONT record overflow critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882

Equation Editor MTEF contains an overlong FONT typeface field, the vulnerable copy primitive for CVE-2017-11882. This is stronger evidence than the Equation Editor CLSID alone because it identifies the malformed record that drives code execution in EQNEDT32.EXE.
CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759

RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6529506-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION

ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6529506-0
Equation Editor object class critical RTF_OBJCLASS_EQUATION

Object class 'equation.3' references Equation Editor
PE header (with DOS stub) in hex data critical RTF_MZ_HEX

Hex-encoded PE (MZ + DOS stub) found inside RTF — likely an embedded executable payload
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
Large hex data blocks in OLE object high RTF_EXCESSIVE_HEX

RTF contains ~1923KB of hex-encoded data inside \objdata sections — may hide a payload
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAM

RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE

One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordm In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00002bdf.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2BDF	961600 bytes
SHA-256: `5c8cd959fe074a18227a1d2ed285866c242ae93cfcb5b757836bfa35a57628cb`
Detection ClamAV: No threats found Obfuscation or payload: likely Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_VIRTUALPROTECT, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, VirtualProtect, GetProcAddress, ExitProcess
`objdata_01_off001f31ca.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F31CA	4183 bytes
SHA-256: `3382db8f6b736b12a349df724ee213f8b536038f5c7beb126a29c161b5ef93e5`
`objdata_02_off001f5478.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1F5478	3826 bytes
SHA-256: `04f13a7b14f7c3e3d24e7b2d23b1bc798138fb3c2a319deb587dfde1eb9f06b1`
`objdata_03_off001fe59e.bin`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1FE59E	3546 bytes
SHA-256: `36fe84fb4e0a04625f538d5d0500c2c322c910f643bd6f8c46500ff5f6fe6bbc`

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