Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1e3785d5df1be258…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.5 KB Created: 2021-09-13 09:21:40 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: 889e60aa45df1c5c5afbed0e5b668829 SHA-1: a98e4c273b1a4a87eb8fead920e73be2b6972f6c SHA-256: 1e3785d5df1be2589a74c77d36f13225a5f2b0de21608b24a3dcf8cfe987dea9
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and numerous external URIs, with several heuristics indicating a malicious intent. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest this is a phishing or malware distribution document. The embedded links, including one pointing to a raw IP address and others to compromised WordPress sites, are key indicators of an attempt to redirect users to malicious content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://panificioilcavaliere.it/userfiles/files/8799477962.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://gramercygrand.ru/files/file/mizixopiger.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://185.33.116.145/~acus01/upload/files/98384929202.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://www.insurancedirectcanada.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613c2bd7f1f25---rejisudanabupokibe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://twinmd.ru/userfiles/file/xodidakiwapapibi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ventiliatoriai.lt/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/65378310658.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://shipagents.nl/uploadfiles/file/vopidumoxuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://123kozijnofferte.nl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c1b719a8d7d99e8fa940cefb043d4429/17484195817.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://michelesherrinlaw.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/lawujulup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gt-outillages.fr/ressource/site-image/files/gimidupuzurilogozenagebo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://topopentertainment.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613ad8f0078e6---xekenutaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://motocams.cz/ckfinder/userfiles/files/tivupatasubazizalej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nadiadsa.org/userfiles/file/44527953328.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://istvietnam.com/rich_editor/file/mexesurukolerifidafemim.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://haciendaloscipreses.cl/upload/file/10315287038.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://groupburuemas2.com/contents/files/87820554277.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://thedreams.cz/files/jabixevon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://karaokejdi.com/ckfinder/core/connector/php/upload/files/bagedopawurafabavepaluvon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://braciszewska-klimek.pl/fck_files/file/dakuvinejipuza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://maidintown.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f2476236a5c2d55cf0ded62c84a02462/rakofegifex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bartonsteel.com/tony/barton/ckfinder/userfiles/files/gikam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://robertmatzuzi-massagetherapist.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16136ccfd1cd64---62654818955.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studiotipaldo.com/userfiles/files/33665010600.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.solucionaesp.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/lagidubexe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://iringmalaysia.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/75134017577.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/Om9ozkHLxGw/uplcv?utm_term=whatsapp+export+ios+to+androidPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e3f6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE3F6 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000fc08.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFC08 17184 bytes
SHA-256: 219ca5680e28bb2d8c7b2f4f7ab3d5c43bd2979fb436f4c7e520e401341aee36
font_02_sfnt_off00012804.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12804 10536 bytes
SHA-256: fa5baf428814714ce57e8acc76601fdd4d7f7c67914fa66d6f49a793ca5606da

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