Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1e21e51df4e3f6eb…

MALICIOUS

RTF

658.8 KB First seen: 2021-01-11
MD5: 66169fa0c616e48bb6cc661cfbadfb0b SHA-1: a3287816a4627b80a274eae8d17deae92e7205ad SHA-256: 1e21e51df4e3f6eb92a3dc20c1012a7adb23f7a31b82cfa1ef424d660b3561f6
302 Risk Score

Heuristics 9

  • Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) critical CVE related CVE_2017_8570
    RTF \objdata decodes to OLE data containing the Composite Moniker — CVE-2017-8570 (drops SCT script) CLSID — the vulnerable control/moniker is embedded directly in the document's object stream, the delivery shape of this exploit. RTF objects auto-render when Word opens the file.
  • CVE-2017-0199 / CVE-2017-8759 (OLE2Link auto-activated remote loader) critical CVE related RTF_OLE2LINK_REMOTE_MONIKER_LOADER
    RTF embeds an OLE2Link object that is force-activated with \objupdate (no user interaction on open) and fetches a remote second stage — through an INCLUDETEXT/INCLUDEPICTURE field or the OLE object's own moniker. This is the OLE2Link auto-update attack path shared by CVE-2017-0199 (server returns an HTA/scriptlet) and CVE-2017-8759 (server returns a SOAP WSDL the .NET parser compiles). Office processes the fetched response through the same code path; the specific CVE depends on the now-unreachable server content type.
  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact high EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://alcpune.online/4PTfuvaYKR3y05l.exe In RTF body

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000053c8.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x53C8 4380 bytes
SHA-256: f5d8baaec02dab15db564c67a35f45324190366bbab6dbadd84ed82f8b859d14
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Static shellcode analysis recovered command string(s): WScript.Shell") 'eriuehji vuere vrieuv hhev eiuhve vvshvisud etrbevfd hjdf gfgg
objdata_01_off00054e91.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x54E91 977 bytes
SHA-256: 3973ac75095c94c9ecd9f138a4740d01e3efa5eeb0eb0be7385592db2de8d47c
objdata_02_off00055640.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x55640 3621 bytes
SHA-256: 0745a1c17cf9be2e09e8a3c99743313a0ece40871cd2ec57f5f8c593eace973c

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