Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1e21948de32c0c7e…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

21.3 KB
MD5: c6f3d254d49fa2353930df009dc03a0b SHA-1: 7d978335a918c4953a0d77c0f89d9a8d29a5ff29 SHA-256: 1e21948de32c0c7e56f61080cb6224f730c36a33d102cdeb8a788a9604d99fdb
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects that are automatically linked and updated, indicating an attempt to exploit OLE activation mechanisms. The presence of `RTF_OBJDATA`, `RTF_OBJAUTLINK`, and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristics strongly suggests that the document is designed to trigger the execution of malicious code embedded within these objects. This is a common technique for delivering second-stage payloads.

Heuristics 3

  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001fa3.bin
25ed3a524c8ba23af07c55ab43f288bb6de188f0ac5e4cc0d4cc2f8f80cbd863
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1FA3 1656 bytes