Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1e1fd4465f359240…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.18 MB
MD5: 7c6b08b37c2791ec1361a949d281a59d SHA-1: 8a92bb7e0fddb92c5aca112bc61dfead2664dcb8 SHA-256: 1e1fd4465f359240adcc8c987bfe1d3ab7234487e65b47aa51c24702779db21d
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an encrypted OOXML file that contains an embedded Equation Editor OLE object, a common carrier for exploits. The encryption with a default password and the presence of the Equation Editor object strongly suggest it's designed to deliver a malicious payload. No scripts were extracted, and no document body was available for analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.