Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1de8a2b60e2c0f4b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

27.5 KB
MD5: f6c1172d2296a8f117f132935858735b SHA-1: 0036fe9be10590e85fe589026f2ef281be837785 SHA-256: 1de8a2b60e2c0f4b04ae0574d84a1ac2e69204aa39d1ffd0de73e642a5f7de76
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic. This indicates the exploitation of a vulnerability within the Equation Editor component. The ".objupdate" directive further suggests that the embedded OLE object is automatically activated upon opening the document, leading to code execution. The presence of OLE object data and the Equation Editor exploit strongly suggest the document is designed to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001b3f.bin
4a2dd962ab5a3a0bcef2261a871fd196941381a637a1d00f2dce4050150b431d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1B3F 2002 bytes