Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1dda955812b724ea…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

86.6 KB Created: 1996-12-17 01:32:42 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 595c774b4c45714482b9b359ca8bbd70 SHA-1: c95b4281c147b576ba18500ce087cb5f9a9c7f07 SHA-256: 1dda955812b724ea5a33b755248ab0e12bde1d5eb282c14766736b75a59a6622
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File: User Execution T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell

The sample is an Excel file that triggers a critical heuristic for CVE-2009-3129, indicating an exploit for a known Excel vulnerability. This is further supported by heuristics indicating suspicious command execution and PEB access, suggesting the exploit is used to run malicious code. The presence of embedded URLs, though mostly benign, includes unknown domains that could be related to payload delivery. The file's purpose is likely to exploit this vulnerability to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 5

  • CVE-2009-3129 — Excel FEATHEADER record overflow critical CVE exact CVE_2009_3129
    Workbook BIFF stream contains a FEATHEADER (Feature Header) record with anomalous size (record_size=22, isf=4, cbHdrData=4). Legitimate FEATHEADER records are tiny (<100 bytes) and carry cbHdrData values that fit in the record body; the value here is the documented CVE-2009-3129 exploit primitive — cbHdrData drives a memcpy with attacker-controlled size, leading to memory corruption and code execution in Excel 2007/2003.
  • PEB access via FS segment (x86) high SC_PEB_ACCESS
    PEB access via FS segment (x86)
  • Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag high SC_STR_CMD
    Suspicious cmd.exe invocation with execution flag
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 88,638 bytes but its declared streams total only 24,565 bytes — 64,073 bytes (72%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.pdf-repair.com
    • http://www.pdf-repair.com)/Producer(Advanced
    • http://www.pdf-repair.com)/ModDate(D:20100406171120+08
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

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