Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1dbc537906533610…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

21.2 KB
MD5: b95695eed70ff814ada8d5a66cb09c4f SHA-1: 070f73f03448eaf4b19cc5d89766ecd41c89a05a SHA-256: 1dbc5379065336104082ad10b5afe16b5b16531bbd7373fda8a9e64d13b48fa6
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic. This indicates the exploitation of a vulnerability within the Microsoft Equation Editor component. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic further suggests that the embedded OLE object is automatically activated upon opening the document. The presence of these critical heuristics strongly points to an exploit delivery mechanism, likely intended to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000014a2.bin
7ca0775ab082dc625a16726657762009c8a64e4afbf43fbecd92ba229f2ff65b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x14A2 1536 bytes