Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1dadcebda50d780b…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

25.2 KB First seen: 2022-12-05
MD5: c606acecd358fd31c4dcf705b8149909 SHA-1: 9903da58f2f20d581fb6bc26a188eef8818b60e6 SHA-256: 1dadcebda50d780b0212750915425b58f269f4496b3b59220b8daeedb66bff8f
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 User Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that exploits the Equation Editor vulnerability. It contains an OLE object and uses \objupdate to force activation, indicating an attempt to execute embedded code. The document body includes a lure to 'Enable editing' to bypass security measures, suggesting it's a dropper for a malicious payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000045aa.bin
4d4a73a5e3c7923ea821011e13fabe19c9aa5f99af9989cb218d851778c96ab3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x45AA 1769 bytes