Malicious PDF / .A — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1d37fe44784cd035…

MALICIOUS

PDF / .A

3.4 KB Created: 2005-09-29 09:27:34 UTC Authoring application: Adobe PDF Library 8.0
MD5: fb79de6e30a80f0ef0ab02a0d07c42eb SHA-1: 082aee1d20575908d279249f8626d77ac6cb7e72 SHA-256: 1d37fe44784cd03588994a7ef5f555130aa7b60ccaabcc0be277a0d9828f6394
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and an embedded file, triggering heuristics for JavaScript actions and embedded files. A critical heuristic identifies the CVE-2010-0188 exploit targeting Adobe Reader's LibTIFF component, which is used to deliver an XFA image payload. This indicates the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability upon opening, likely to execute the embedded JavaScript which in turn would download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains XFA image data with an inline crafted TIFF payload and shellcode/delivery markers. This is the data-bound variant of the CVE-2010-0188 Adobe Reader LibTIFF/XFA exploit shape.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0004.bin
fd7960c60f376507c29f06bba6fc50b9ed112bd894b6d4f35b5e6a60aa79c071
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 4 at offset 0x1C6 35879 bytes