Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 1d2b1a505bd7e1dd…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

229.3 KB
MD5: 450f671222cf1ba68550b1542438b510 SHA-1: b2417868d0bb28e80d31391e4cdf9b83dc7af4f3 SHA-256: 1d2b1a505bd7e1dddaf28ba202ec88ee063b21bfbbd75d011c5d2592557811fc
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple OLE objects, including automatically linked objects that are forced to update. This technique is commonly used to bypass macro security warnings and execute embedded malicious content. The presence of the SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic further indicates that the document is designed to trick the user into enabling content execution. No specific malware family could be identified.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 3 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
0a0065d5b1861527e05170e8e7e4f0ab0de4435113c0e49dcf0c5cc4a518004d
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 20634 bytes
objdata_01_off0000b1ac.bin
18cff8ef194415d33763880bf64011d23305e4b9143b76244b89e1c53b70a0d5
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB1AC 2632 bytes
objdata_02_off0000c74f.bin
44deae4627fee3c44f54d5bd10477ec2e17f4c08135f08e2417832e36d10d037
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xC74F 12297 bytes